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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1 One of the solutions proposed both by politicians and scholars to deal with the alleged democratic deficit 
of the European Union is to favour direct participation of EU citizens in decision-making at the European 
level. The object of D.8.7 is to assess the viability of EU referenda as a mechanism of direct democracy. 
2 Direct democracy is by no means in contradiction to representative democracy. From a normative point of 
view, a combination of direct democratic instruments and representative instruments seems to be the 
most desirable institutional setup. This also applies to the European Union. 
3 So far, there is insufficient evidence supporting the critiques against direct democracy both at the national 
and the European level. On the one hand, the objections bring to light general problems of democracy that 
will neither disappear nor tail off by abstaining from direct democracy, but need to be addressed by legal 
instruments that apply in direct and representative democracies. On the other hand, both the objections 
and the related empirical research highlight that direct democracy needs to be in a complementary 
relationship with representative democracy and should be integrated within robust constitutional 
conditions that guarantee fundamental rights and the principle of subsidiarity.    
4 This deliverable proposes a model for a European referendum that is: 1) held on EU internal issues of 
primary law; 2) mandatory; 3) simultaneous in all member states; 4) binding; and 5) simple regarding 
subject matter.  
5 Empirically, this deliverable shows that current practices of referenda on EU issues in European member 
states produce distortions in democratic functioning, due to the ad hoc way in which the referenda are 
held. Firstly, optional referenda favour that the incumbent government call for a referendum only on 
issues for which they receive strong support. As such, optional government induced referenda are used as 
strategic instruments, i.e. as plebiscites. Secondly, optional referenda allow some member states to have a 
stronger negotiation power than others, especially when they are not held simultaneously. Thirdly, 
optional referenda produce discrimination among EU citizens since only a few of them are given the right 
to participate. 
6 According to survey data, a majority of citizens in Europe would be willing to vote in a EU referendum. 
Statistical analysis shows that the Europeans who are more likely to vote in a EU referendum exhibit 
stronger support for the European Union. Giving the vote to EU citizens in referenda, therefore, would not 
necessarily block the integration process, at least not in a medium to long-term perspective. 
7 The Swiss case is used as a paradigmatic example from which we draw a number of lessons for the 
European Union. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the solutions that have been brought forward by political theorists in face of the alleged democratic 
deficit of the European Union is the expansion of direct democracy (DD) instruments to the European arena 
(e.g. Rose 2013).  Deliverable 8.8 is in charge of the novel European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI); it is the task of this 
deliverable to assess the potentiality of other direct democracy tools at the European level, namely referenda.1 
To this end, we ask: how and what types of referenda have been used until now on EU affairs? What can we 
learn from past experiences both inside and outside the European Union? 
Despite wider theoretical debates between defenders and detractors of DD (see below), there tends to be 
agreement among many scholars, politicians, and citizens that decisions are factually more legitimate if taken 
by popular vote. Notwithstanding mixed evidence in this regard, there is a strong normative component in 
favour of direct democracy. This is particularly the case with regard to the European Union, often accused of 
taking decisions far away from the European citizens. Introducing a vote in referenda at the EU level to the now 
very limited set of political rights could bridge the gap between EU institutions and EU citizens and promote 
perceptions of legitimacy of EU decisions among the European citizenry. From the point of view of citizenship, 
this would certainly strengthen the notion of EU citizenship by broadening the scope of EU citizens’ political 
rights. 
Yet the benefits of a potential EU referendum remain uncertain. So far there has been no single attempt to 
conduct a referendum in all EU member states simultaneously. The few votes on EU issues have mainly had (as 
we will show in this report) a plebiscitary character, as the referenda where mostly called by the governments. 
For this reason, the task of this paper is particularly challenging and requires several steps. Firstly, we discuss 
the normative value of DD at any level of government and the theoretical problems of applicability in the 
European arena. From this discussion we derive potential recommendations for DD to be applied at the 
European level: we argue that EU referenda should be mandatory, contain only one relatively narrow issue (as 
opposed to a large package-deal), and be simultaneous in all European member states. Secondly, we evaluate 
empirically the implications of our main premise in the European context. Thirdly, we analyze EU citizens’ 
support for referenda at the European level. And fourthly, we conclude with a comparison with the Swiss case. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 An alternative to the use of DD would be to strengthen the role of the European parliament and its relationship with 
national parliaments, but we only focus on DD in this paper, since the role of the parliament is the object of 
Deliverables 8.1, 8.4, and 8.5. 
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 2. CONCEPTUALIZATION AND NORMATIVE THEORY OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
2.1 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
One of the main controversies surrounding debates on DD departs from the assumption that direct democracy 
represents a pure model of democracy, which is in contradiction with representative democracy (Hug 2008). 
Representative Democracy is based on the idea of free and fair elections under conditions of rule of law and 
fundamental freedoms. It is the democratic system claimed by all EU member states and by most democratic 
states in the world. A system that grants to citizens the right to a referendum and initiative combined with 
representative democracy in one form or another is usually called direct democracy, semi-direct democracy or 
hybrid democracy (Neumann 2009; Schiller 2002; Kirchgässner et al. 1999; Christmann 2012).2  
There is a conceptual difference between direct and representative democracy, but they are not mutually 
exclusive and co-exist in reality. Even in constitutional systems in which direct democracy plays a very 
important role, such as Switzerland, direct democracy is connected to a representative system and most 
legislation is proposed by government and passed by parliament.3 Where in place and properly applied, direct 
democracy is thus neither a totally separate element nor an appendix to representative democracy that leaves 
the rest of the system unchanged. It has a systematic influence on democratic decision-making. At the same 
time, direct democracy fulfils the strict notion of popular sovereignty even if connected to representative 
democracy, as we will show. It is not our intention to defend the strict voluntaristic notion of popular 
sovereignty as such, but rather to show that different forms of direct democracy are not in contradiction with 
the idea of popular sovereignty. 
The basic conceptual difference between direct and representative democracy is indeed rooted in different 
understandings of popular sovereignty. According to the strict notion of popular sovereignty, prominently 
developed by Rousseau (Du contrat social, III, xii-xiv), representation of acts of sovereignty of the people, such 
as constitutional decision-making or voting of generally binding laws, is not possible without cancelling popular 
sovereignty and adding a particular will to the general will. Only the rightfully assembled citizens themselves 
and their collective decisions embody the people and express the sovereign will of the people. The irrevocable 
delegation of legislative decision-making power to a group of representatives transforms the general will into a 
particular will.  
One important implication of this theory is that the application of the law to specific cases is not an act of the 
general will of the sovereign. It is a particular judgment to be carried out by a different actor and according to 
specific criteria. The sovereign people cannot apply the law to specific cases without conceptual contradiction 
against the general will (and tyrannical consequences). The competence to perform such acts of application of 
the law to specific cases, be they executive or jurisprudential, needs to be delegated to different branches of 
government. Direct democracy based on this strict notion of popular sovereignty thus implies separation of 
powers and delegation of executive and judiciary powers to special representatives of the people. A structural 
element of representation is thus necessarily present in a precise sense: Constitutional and legislative power 
cannot be delegated to representatives; executive and judiciary power must be delegated to mandatories.  We 
will come back to the question what this means in terms of institutional design of direct democracy. 
Furthermore, in direct democracy it is analytically impossible for the people’s government not to be based on 
fundamental rules. The sovereign people are constituted by rules that can only be disrespected by the 
2 We are aware that a referendum is in itself not equivalent to direct democracy (for a critique in this regard see Hug 2008: 
252). 
3 However, in such a system the possible “threat” of referendum and potential refusal of new legislation or a concrete 
infrastructure project by a popular vote exerts an ex ante influence on the drafting of legislation. This influence can be 
understood as a bias towards consensual or super-majoritarian decisions in order to avoid referendum. 
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 dissolution of the people as sovereign. Even Rousseau, a fervent defender of the sovereignty of the people, 
analyzed the people in these terms: without fundamental laws there is no politically sovereign people 
(Rousseau, Du contrat social, I. v). The people are constituted by lois fondamentales and act according to loi 
fundamentales. No conceptually sound and legitimate form of direct democracy is possible without some 
degree of rule of law.  
Rousseau rejects delegation of legislative authority to representatives because the general will (i.e. laws based 
on principles that can be universalized) of the people cannot be delegated without transforming it into a 
different and particular will (Rousseau, Du contrat social, III, xv). Does this mean that according to the strict 
notion of popular sovereignty direct democracy can have no legislative assemblies of representatives at all? 
Our answer is negative on the condition that the delegation of legislative power can in general be revoked and 
revised case by case. The sovereign people can delegate legislation to representatives and at the same time 
reserve the right to replace and refuse constitutional and legislative decisions of the representatives. Popular 
sovereignty is not alienated if the people decide to delegate legislation and at the same time reserve the right 
to refusal of constitutional and legislative acts of the representatives. The same is true if the people reserve the 
right to propose their own constitutional amendments by initiatives.  
According to Philip Pettit democratic procedures must be designed in such a manner that the people can be 
reasonably understood as authors and editors of the law. Some form of authoritative proposal of constitutional 
legislation and a right to revise or refuse legislation by the people is thus necessary (Pettit 1997; 2012). 
Permanently possible and institutionally guaranteed participation of the people in the drafting and revising of 
legislation is a necessary condition of popular sovereignty (Pettit 1997, 277). The general prohibition of 
revocable representation on the other hand is not a necessary condition of direct democracy. In order to 
illustrate this condition Pettit uses the analogy of the newspaper edition, of which he distinguishes the author 
of the news (law) – who writes the news (law) –, and the editor of the newspaper (law) – who chooses the 
person who writes the news (law). The search and identification function of new legislation that should be 
possible for the people translates into the condition that the citizens need to be able to understand themselves 
as the authors of legislation. This condition is only partially fulfilled if citizens can merely elect representatives 
and their political programs in free and fair elections.  Authoring a text and choosing the author of a text are 
two different things. Besides all the formal and substantive problems of representation and majority voting, 
the delegation of legislation creates a problem of agency loss of the people when it comes to form coalitions 
between different parties with different programs and the casting of general political programs into law.  The 
constitutional guarantee of periodic repetition of elections does not substantively change this. The politically 
sovereign people must therefore reserve the right to revise, refuse and eventually replace law according to 
constitutionally guaranteed procedures. Pettit’s proposals how to do this are rather vague (Pettit 1997: 187-
200). We hold that the effective realization of the condition that the people be the authors and editors of law 
implies direct democratic instruments of referendum and initiative within constitutional boundaries. In other 
words, from a normative point of view, a combination of direct democratic instruments and representative 
instruments seems to be the most desirable institutional setting. This is true for a single demos system. As we 
will show, this also holds for the EU, at least as a realistic ideal towards which the EU could evolve. 
The concrete implementation of such institutional setting can still take on many different forms, which might 
not be equally valid for all contexts and all times. “Consequently, the debate about referenda should revolve 
around the question to what extent our democratic systems of representation should be and can be 
complemented by more direct means of citizen influence. … And it is obviously in this context that the 
arguments for or against referenda have to be made and evaluated.”(Hug 2008, 253). Such a debate becomes 
particularly complex in relation to the European Union, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the European Union 
does not totally match the notion of representative democracy, as we know it for the national level, although 
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 this is explicitly stated in Title II, Article 10.1 of the Treaty of Lisbon.4 Secondly, most member states already 
have experience with direct democracy at the national, regional, or local levels, which makes it a complex 
situation to establish a single direct democratic instrument. And thirdly, there has so far been no common 
referendum at the EU level to judge whether indeed direct democracy is a feasible option in the European 
Union. As a consequence, adding elements of direct democracy to the European level requires substantial 
democratic innovation. As the consequences of such innovation are never certain to be positive, it is prudent to 
construe direct democracy in the EU step by step and with a limited scope. Even if the institutional reforms of 
the Lisbon Treaty moved a step forward in this direction by combining elements of representative and direct 
democracy, the latter – especially – remains underdeveloped in the EU (see D8.8 on the weaknesses of the 
ECI).  
2.2 THE CITIZENSHIP DIRECTIVE AND THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE COUNTRIES OF OUR STUDY 
Before we can start thinking about ways to improve citizen participation via direct democracy in the EU, a 
conceptual and normative assessment is needed. In this section we develop the notion and justification of 
direct democracy on the basis of its critique and of experience with existing forms of direct democracy.  At least 
six important objections have been raised against direct or semi-direct democracy, whose refined analysis and 
further empirical examination deepen the understanding of democracy overall. These critiques are particularly 
acute when applied to the European Union. We will summarize these points and then address them in more 
depth. First, governmental representatives and political elites dispose of more information than the normal 
citizens. They are, hence, in a better position to make factually adequate decisions. Given the pressure of 
periodic elections, they take these decisions with their voters in mind, anticipating the possibility of their own 
imminent rejection at the ballot box. Therefore, the exercise of power in the area of legislation by 
representatives is not only conceptually possible from the point of view of popular sovereignty but also more 
advantageous for all. Furthermore, from an economic point of view, representative democracy saves 
information costs for the citizens (Feld and Kirchgässner 2000). Second, direct democracy only works in small, 
manageable societies, but is inadequate for rather large modern nation states. It is particularly inadequate for 
a polity as large as the EU. Third, direct democracy results in disproportionate influence of powerful pressure 
groups and well-financed interests. Fourth, direct democracy favours expressive voting behaviour and 
populism. Fifth, direct democracy violates the general accountability principle, because the people are 
accountable to nobody and cannot be called to account for their actions and decisions, whereas 
representatives can be held accountable and removed from office. Sixth, a heightened conformity with the 
majority in direct democracy is to the detriment of rights of social minorities and of individual rights. As we will 
show in the following lines, there is little evidence that these objections apply only to direct democratic 
systems, as most scholars fail to acknowledge that pure direct democracy is rarely to be found. Indeed, these 
six objections are systematically framed as a contradiction between direct and representative democracy, 
without taking into consideration that both direct and representative institutions might suffer from the same 
illnesses. 
As concerns the first objection, it is claimed that citizens lack the necessary competence (either information or 
know-how) to be able to take reasoned decisions in referenda. Representatives are much better informed that 
the average citizen, and therefore decision-making should always be delegated to them. This critique is yet to 
be nuanced. On the one hand, the fact that representatives have an advantage in terms of information over 
those being represented, needs to be specified according to different types of relevant information for 
legislative decisions. With regard to possible effects of a law on the constituency, the information advantage of 
representatives is not self-evident. People might know better than representatives how political decisions will 
play out in their life-world. Referenda itself (as well as elections) might be an important source of information 
4 Title II, Article 10.1 “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.” 
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 for the citizens as the proposals are campaigned. There is in fact evidence that the advance in information of 
representatives vis-à-vis the voters is more probable but is decreasing when the intensity of campaigning 
increases (Kriesi 2008). All in all, lack of competence of citizens is also argued in the context of election of 
representatives: why should voters be more competent in deciding about a single person than about a specific 
policy? On the other hand, if representatives actually have an information advantage, periodic elections might 
not suffice to guarantee that they will not abuse the information advantage to pass laws that serve their own 
interests. In any case, nothing stands against the argument, that a supplementary control mechanism of 
legislative decisions via direct democracy increases the probability that legislators use their information 
advantage to pass laws that correspond to the needs and intentions of the people. Referendum might thus be 
an efficient instrument to ensure that representatives do not use their advance in information for their own 
profit. Moreover, it compels representatives to intensified public communication and the public to increased 
deliberation about the reasons for their decisions. Furthermore, voting campaigns have an information effect 
that leads to a generally better informed citizenry (Benz and Stutzer 2004), although not all citizens benefit 
equally from increased participation (Hopmann et al. 2015). This results in the thesis of a desired 
complementary relationship between representative democracy (advance in information, competent 
preparation of bills) and direct democratic instruments (control, mobilization, political education) (Buchanan 
2001; Kriesi 2008). In practice this complementary relationship exists also where direct democracy is especially 
robust. For instance, the US political system is referred to as a hybrid system and the Swiss system is referred 
to as the semi-direct democracy (Garret 2005; Linder 2006).  
The objection of the lack of competence of the citizens vis-à-vis the European decision-making procedures is 
more critical, since knowledge of EU politics is very low.5 Member states’ media inform fundamentally about 
national politics, which makes it difficult to follow what happens in Europe. For example, in relation to the Irish 
Nice Treaty referendum, Moravcsik affirmed that “ignorance was so great that the slogan 'If you don't know, 
vote “no”' carried the day ” (Moravcsik 2006, 159). Yet, in Europe even more than at the national level, this 
criticism also applies to the institutions of representative democracy of the EU. Complexity of European policy-
making and the fact that political parties mainly compete in the national arena makes it very hard for citizens to 
know who is representing them at the European level. From this perspective, it might be less demanding for 
the EU citizens to vote on a specific issue by a referendum than to decide whom to vote for in EP elections.  
The second objection about the impossibility of direct democracy in large states is a widely held view that was 
prominently presented by Montesquieu with regard to England (Esprit des lois, Book XI, ch. 6) and by Madison 
(Hamilton 2005 (Federalist 10). Ever since an influential book posited the thesis that the quality of any 
democracy – be it direct or representative – declines if the population exceeds a certain size (Dahl and Tufte 
1984), it has often been repeated in recent research. While the latest Zurich NCCR-Democracy Barometer has 
not found a direct correlation between state size and democratic quality, it has found that consensus 
democracies perform better than majoritarian democracy as measured by the examined criteria. Concordance 
systems, which entail the typical elements of consensus democracies, arise more easily in small states (Boschler 
and Kriesi 2013, 69–102). If one looks at the question about the quality of democracies only for the 30 
established democracies or for the 69 democracies of the NCCR-Democracy Barometer, then this pre-selection 
is not taken into account. It becomes apparent, however, that the democratization of very large countries is 
unlikely without them being decomposed into smaller units. All this indicates that the objection, if it applies at 
all, should not be raised against direct democracy specifically, but against the excessive size of the state, be it 
governed by representative or direct democracy. The excessive size of a state is detrimental to democracy and 
democratization. But also this thesis cannot give any definitive criteria regarding the requested precise size of a 
5 For example, on average, less than 50% of Europeans profess to know about their rights as citizens of the EU, according to 
Eurobarometer data 2015. 
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 democratic or direct democratic country. On the one hand there exist conceptual controversies. Is democracy’s 
relevant state size measured by the number of members, or also by its geographical extent, or also by the 
geographical distribution of the population? On the other hand, the variables that affect the ratio between size 
and democracy are constantly shifting due to technological changes in transport and communication.  Hence it 
might be possible that a state used to be much “larger” at an earlier date, despite its much lower population 
size, than it is now. Correspondingly, democracy could be realized in “larger” units because they actually are, as 
measured by the conditions of communication, not larger at all. Size is a relative parameter.  
The view that the quality of direct democracy declines as its size increases and that this loss of quality can be 
counter-balanced through representative democracy is based on assumptions that need to be clarified. Both 
the decline in voting power with an increasing number of members as well as the high decision making 
obstacles and information barriers of collective action are invoked as justifications for the loss of quality and for 
the compensation. The hurdles of aggravated collective action and of high information costs in larger groups 
are indeed compensated for in representative democracies by a very much smaller representative body 
(parliament). But such a system causes an increased loss of control, firstly because of representatives’ deviating 
action on single proposals, and second because of the conclusion of compromise packages in parliament 
(Besley and Coate 2008). This loss of control is accentuated by the steadily growing importance of international 
relations and the resulting weight of the executive branch (Feld and Kirchgässner 2004: 206f.). The decline in 
citizen’s voting power with increasing number of members is not balanced out by representative democracy. 
Last but not least, this criticism departs from the assumption that the distinction is between pure direct 
democracy and pure representative democracy, whereas there is no physical impediment in conducting a 
referendum throughout a large territory at the same time as representative institutions work. 
In general, there is no definite thesis against direct democracy in large states as compared to representative 
democracy. In practice, direct democratic instruments are a long-lasting fact in large states, however not in its 
undiluted form but in a mutual relationship of control to representative democracy and the judiciary, and via 
further mitigation through federalism. The biggest state with a direct democracy is California with its 
population of about 40 million, with about 23 million people entitled to vote and an area that is more than 10 
times as large as Switzerland.  A total of 27, in part very large federal states of the US exhibit direct democratic 
instruments (Waters 2003: 12). Approximately 70% of the US population lives in a state or in a city in which 
representative democracy and direct democracy are in a supplementary relationship, both horizontally as well 
as vertically. The US and Germany, unlike Switzerland, apply direct democracy only at the level of federal states 
or states (Bundesländer). The reason for this is not the size, but the founders’ different understandings of the 
sovereignty of the people and the different constitutional traditions. Influential founders of the USA and of the 
Federal Republic of Germany were against direct democracy, at least for the federal level. They conceived their 
constitutions such that constituent acts of the federation could not be carried out directly by popular vote. The 
modern Swiss state introduced the right to initiative already in the 1848 constitution; further direct democratic 
instruments were introduced on the federal level 1874. Today Switzerland applies direct democracy at all levels 
of government including at the federal level.  
Both in theory and in practice, therefore, there seems to be no solid argument against the institutionalization 
of referenda at the European level, which would not apply also to representative institutions. The decision to 
incorporate referenda as an instrument of political decision at the European level (and the decision on where 
the EU wants to go) appears to depend more on the political will of European elites rather than on practical 
constraints. Actual institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the ECI, suggest that the 
EU is slowly moving towards the Swiss model. So far, however, there are no other examples equivalent to the 
Swiss model (neither bigger nor smaller) that would let us evaluate how well/badly referenda could work in the 
European context. 
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 The third objection that direct democracy leads to a bigger influence of powerful pressure groups than 
representative democracy is at odds with some studies based on game theory and with empirical studies 
(Buchanan 2001). Yet, there is no complete evidence that the policy outcomes of hybrid or semi-direct 
democracies are closer to the majority’s preferences than a purely representative system. In the US, the direct 
democratic instruments were introduced with the explicit intention of containing the influence of pressure 
groups on parliaments. This argument could also be applied to the European Union, where lobbying plays a 
major role in policy decision-making. A report of Transparency International shows that lobbying is extremely 
powerful in Europe and in the European Union in particular.6 “There is no precise figure available for the 
number of lobbyists in Brussels, but some estimates have suggested that 15,000 – 30,000 people are actively 
employed in trying to influence the work of the EU institutions. Two-thirds work on behalf of business interests 
while civil society and trade unions remain dramatically under-represented. Corporate lobbying in Brussels has 
long passed the one billion euro mark in annual turnover, which makes the city the world’s second biggest 
centre of corporate lobbying power, after Washington DC. […] There are many legitimate reasons for wanting 
to have a say in decision making, but the power of money combined with the complex and often 
unaccountable decision-making procedures within the EU – and the lack of any real scrutiny – have created an 
environment where big business interests can effectively capture the policy agenda. This makes Brussels a 
corporate lobbying paradise.”7  
Contrary to other contexts, therefore, the use of referenda could partially help to avoid lobbies’ influence in 
policy decisions at the EU level. Indeed, while the costs of lobbying might be affordable if centralized in 
Brussels, they might be less sustainable if obliged to sustain the campaign costs in all 28 member states. Thus, 
referenda could be a valuable instrument to reduce the power of interest groups in the EU.  
The fourth objection, that direct democracy fosters expressive and emotional voting behavior and is like 
cheering for one’s own team during a football match rather than rational decision making, is not necessarily to 
be interpreted negatively. Expressive voting behavior may also mobilize moral resources (Brennan 2000). The 
negative interpretation of the thesis, however, on the one hand neglects the collective processes of 
deliberation and learning that we find in direct democracy (Smith 2007; Smith and Tolbert 2007; Tolbert 2005). 
To be sure, learning and deliberation depend on the quality of the media (Curran et al. 2009), yet there is no 
evidence to our knowledge that the press and broadcasting media are more powerful in influencing referenda 
than electoral campaigns. On the other hand, it is not obvious that issue-related votes are more emotionalized 
than elections. Persons provoke emotions over themselves and over issues. Consequently, elections are also 
susceptible to severe polarization and to stir up strong emotions, not least because they also involve 
contentious factual issues. Candidates standing for election need to sharpen their profile by means of their 
political program. That direct democracy would systematically favour populism more than representative 
democracy has not been proven. The populist tendencies in representative democracies with little or no direct 
democratic instruments are widely documented (Mény and Surel 2002). More so, it is easier to entirely capture 
a democratic system by populism via representative democracy than via a semi-direct democracy, in which 
every major legislative decision can be put to a popular vote. The examples of Poland, Hungary and the 
developments in France or the republican primaries in the USA illustrate this quite well. Switzerland on the 
other hand has had individual votes with populist tendencies, but the majority of votes do not have this 
character and the system as a whole has never tilted entirely towards populism. One can thus hypothesize that 
direct democracy is more robust against populism than representative systems.  
This issue appears to be especially relevant in the European context, since European elections are normally 
ascribed as second order elections. There is considerable literature on the fact that European citizens use EP 
6 ‘Lobbying in Europe: Hidden Influence, Privileged Access’ 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2015_lobbyingineurope_en?e=2496456/12316229 
7 Brussels: The EU Quarter http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/ceolobbylow.pdf. 
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 elections to express their dis/content with the incumbent government (starting from Reif and Schmitt 1980). 
The question is whether referenda would stimulate the same behaviour among EU citizens. Recent examples 
on the EU constitution are contradictory in this regard, and propel the idea that for expressive and populist 
votes to occur is very much dependent on the type of referendum being held (see below). 
The fifth objection, that direct democracy violates the general accountability principle, because the people are 
accountable to nobody and cannot be held to account for their actions and decisions, applies conditionally. It is 
true that the people cannot be voted out of office as legislators, unlike representatives. As the addressee of 
laws, however, they have to bear the consequences of their own decisions. The problem is that these 
consequences are very unequally distributed among citizens. Yet this is not a problem of direct democracy in 
particular but of – direct or representative – collective action in general. Parliaments’ decisions too have 
consequences, which affect citizens very unequally. The advantage of direct democracy is that it fosters more 
individual responsibility and that it allows citizens to exercise more control over these consequences and their 
dissemination. Second, the people can be a party involved in a legal proceeding, and hence they can be 
restrained, both in the international or the national legal system. The prerequisites here are, again, that laws 
constitute the people, and that direct democracy is embedded in the law in the form of the constitutional state 
and international law. According to the ideal of international law, sovereign peoples are accountable to each 
other regarding fundamental rights and various other areas. Moreover, the outer limit of direct-democratic 
sovereignty of the people is peremptory international law. Third, it is true that the individual voters cannot be 
held accountable for their decisions. But this again applies to those voters electing representatives. They can 
give any dubious person their vote in a secret ballot, without being accountable for it. The lack of accountability 
of the electorate is a general feature of democracy, and not specifically of direct democracy.  
In any case, it is questionable if the application of the principle of accountability to voting or electing as 
exercising a right is appropriate at all. Either someone has the right to decide one way or another or the right 
itself to opt for certain options has to be questioned. That is, democracy, be it direct or representative, has to 
be based on a right to make free choices between legitimate options without any further accountability of the 
voters, or it has to legally ban certain bills, parties or candidates. Here again we encounter the general problem 
of the legal constitution of democracy, be it representative or direct democracy. From that point of view, direct 
democracy is problematic if there are no formal and qualitative control mechanisms to review initiatives. 
Where to draw the precise boundaries for any proposal is similarly controversial as is the issue of banning 
political parties in representative democracy. Instead of justifying a specific objection against direct democracy, 
the problem of the accountability of the people rather refers to the problematic circularity of the 
determination of democracy’s legal framework. This problem is mitigated by the restriction of national 
authority, by horizontal and vertical separation of powers within and between democratic peoples, and a 
pluralistic as well as transnationally interconnected civil society. In short, the accountability problem of the 
electorate exists in both direct and representative democracies and needs to be solved by legal constraints of 
the electorate regarding both types of democracy. These legal constraints are crucial in the European Union if 
referenda are to be institutionalized, since majorities from one or more countries could determine the policies 
of another country, without bearing the consequences of these decisions.  
According to the sixth objection the conformity with the majority in direct democracy is to the detriment of 
rights of structural minorities and of individual rights. This is especially well exemplified with the Swiss case. 
There exist some recent studies for Switzerland that find, for the period from the middle of the 19th century, 
that popular rights have had discriminatory effects on women, Jews and Catholics. Since around 1990, the 
same applies for Muslims. With increasing integration of a minority, however, the negative effect decreases. 
Zurich’s Catholic minority received recognition as a state-church in 1963 by popular vote. Linguistic minorities, 
and conscientious objectors are about equally discriminated as religious minorities are. As is well known, 
Switzerland was also the last European country that established women’s suffrage (1971), because men 
rejected it at the ballot box again and again. The Landsgemeinde (cantonal assembly) of Appenzell Innerrhoden 
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 only allowed women to participate as of 1991. Alien residents are the most discriminated group in Switzerland, 
whereas homosexuals and people with disabilities are less disadvantaged. It makes a difference for 
discrimination if a minority possesses voting rights or not. Moreover, whether a minority will be discriminated 
or not depends on its degree of integration (Vatter and Danaci 2010; Vatter 2011). In the case of the US, 
structural minorities are not subject to discrimination by direct democracy because of the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional jurisdiction (Heußer 2012). This does not mean that discrimination in the USA does not exist, 
only that its causes and structural conditions are others than direct democracy. In the European Union, there is 
also the danger that some minorities are discriminated; although we should not expect big differences 
between representative and direct democracy mechanisms of decision making. Again, the use of legal 
constraints is fundamental in protecting minorities in any type of democracy. 
In relation to the European Union, a crucial issue is whether it is possible to aggregate preferences of 
differentiated demoi through referenda, without majorities superseding minorities or minorities vetoing 
policies which are in the benefit of the majority. The choice of the referendum rules shall be fundamental to 
counterbalance the different demoi.  
These six objections provide neither enough reasons nor evidence to justify a ban of direct democracy, and do 
not disprove any of the good reasons for direct democracy named above. On the one hand, the objections 
bring to light general problems of democracy that will not disappear nor tail off by abstaining from direct 
democracy, but need to be addressed by legal instruments that apply in direct and representative democracies. 
On the other hand, both the objections and the related empirical research highlight that direct democracy 
needs be in a complementary relationship with representative democracy and should be integrated within 
robust constitutional conditions that guarantee fundamental rights and the principle of subsidiarity, without it 
being unequivocally definite how far this has to go in particular cases. 
Given these answers to substantive objections against direct democracy the normative argument that direct 
democracy increases legitimacy is relatively straightforward. By legitimacy we understand the broad 
acceptance of a polity, its government, and the governmental decisions by the citizenry and the acceptability of 
the acceptance procedures Political legitimacy is broad acceptance by citizens of institutions and political acts 
under acceptable conditions. More concretely, the normative notion of democratic legitimacy is broad consent 
qualified by conditions such as access to alternative information, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 
inclusiveness of participation, etc. This implies, first, that democratic legitimacy increases if citizens’ rights to 
direct participation and control of governmental decisions increase. Citizens’ rights to direct participation can 
come under the form of referendum and initiative. In both a representative and semi-direct democracy citizens 
have the right to elect but in the latter citizens also have the right to trigger votes collectively, and the right to 
vote. The bundle of participatory rights and the realm of voting increase in a semi-direct democracy giving it a 
participation advantage over purely representative democracy. Government decisions are confirmed (or 
refuted) and are therefore certified with popular acceptance via procedures that are based on equal 
participatory rights. The fact that government decisions can be refuted in a legally binding manner implies their 
acceptance even if citizens call no referendum. Hence the right to binding referenda increases the legitimacy 
not only of the decisions that are taken by popular vote but also on all legislative decisions, even those that are 
only taken by parliament. Furthermore, there is also an upstream effect of referenda. Governments and 
parliaments want to avoid optional referenda. They will thus draw up compromises in their legislative decisions 
that include a broader range of interests, which again is an argument for increased political legitimacy.  
The increased legitimacy of direct democracy can of course be upset by the acceptability of the conditions of 
the voting procedures. For instance the questions, who has access to citizenship and/or the rights to vote (non-
national residents, ethnic minorities, women, etc.) or how campaign financing and the flow of information are 
regulated. It is quite obvious that a representative democracy that gives the right to vote to women and non-
national residents under conditions of freedom of expression would be more legitimate than a direct 
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 democracy of white protestant men under censorship. But these things being equal, direct democracy has a 
legitimacy advantage over a purely representative democracy. A strict focus on output-legitimacy does not 
change this normative diagnosis. Democratic decision-making, be it representative or direct, is meaningful 
under conditions of reasonable dissent over output and outcomes. Output-legitimacy is given if outputs are 
assessed and accepted by a large majority of citizens under acceptable conditions of participatory, fair and 
inclusive decision-making.   
In the European Union, the constitutional conditions of referenda will reveal an essential part of institutional 
innovation. We propose in the following section a specific design for the European Union referenda. 
2.3 A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR EUROPEAN REFERENDA 
Direct democracy can take on many different forms, especially in its combination with representative 
democracy (Kessler 2005). A basic distinction between direct democratic instruments comes down to who 
initiates the procedure: the citizens, the representative authority or the Constitution itself (see Table 1). On the 
one hand, citizens can initiate a process to accept or refuse a text to amend the constitution or the legislation: 
it is a citizen right to statute and set the constitutional agenda. On the other hand, the representative authority 
may call a referendum on a major issue. Lastly, a referendum might be called because the Constitution 
provides dispositions in this regard. The term referendum refers to a popular vote, in which all adult citizens 
have the right to accept or refuse a legislative decision of a representative assembly. Mandatory referenda are 
triggered by a constitutional or legally disposition, whereas optional referenda are called at the discretion of 
the government or collective citizen action. Our empirical focus in this report is on forms of direct democracy 
triggered by the representative authorities vs. mandatory referenda because this is the dominant practice in EU 
member states referenda.8 Both types of referenda have been used in the European context, also in relation to 
EU issues. 
Table 1 Direct democracy instruments 
Initiator Type of instrument 
Citizens 
Optional referendum 
Citizens’ initiative 
Recall 
Citizens’ assembly 
Representative authority 
Optional referendum 
Counter-proposal 
Constitution Mandatory referendum 
 
Based on the normative discussion presented above, we argue here that the calling of a referendum needs to 
be based on a constitutional disposition or citizen action in order to fulfil the democratic conditions elaborated 
in the first section.9 If the referendum is triggered by the government and only consultative (plebiscitary 
democracy) it does not fulfil the conditions of authorship and editorship of the law by the people (see section 
2.1). Rather it is an additional strategic instrument of the government. The combination of direct democracy 
instruments and representative democracy is only effective if citizens can directly control the decision-making 
process through procedures constitutionally guaranteed. Regarding the efficiency of controls that referenda 
should be able to exercise, research shows that the referenda need to be mandatory for certain types of 
primary law. Referenda that are initiated by governments discretionarily, perhaps even with non-binding 
8 Counter-proposals are also initiated by the government, but these originate as a reaction to a citizens’ initiative. For this 
reason, they are not taken into consideration in this deliverable. 
9 The same argument applies for citizens’ initiatives: if the referendum is based on citizen action if also fulfils the conditions 
of authorship and editorship of the law by the people. 
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 effects (plebiscites), benefit governments as additional policy tools and confer them even greater influence. On 
the basis of this argumentation we distinguish between direct and plebiscitary democracy and we propose to 
favor direct over plebiscitary democracy in the EU and elsewhere (see Cheneval 2007 and Table 2). The 
distinction is particularly relevant in the EU context, as recent experiences have shown. Indeed, “one can argue 
that the problem is not the institution of direct democracy per se, but rather the dysfunctional and anti-
democratic way in which it is deployed in the EU context.” (Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2014, 192), where 
referenda on EU issues have only been held on the national level, and most of the times as plebiscites (we 
develop this analysis more in depth in the following sections). 
Table 2 Direct vs. Plebiscitary Democracy 
 Direct Democracy Plebiscitary Democracy 
Trigger of individual vote 
constitutional/legal 
disposition or citizen action 
government- induced 
Political level of application 
(city, state, country, EU) 
Multiple or all  strategically targeted 
Unity/simplicity of subject 
matter 
Yes No 
Sequencing No Yes 
Result legally binding Yes No 
 
We propose therefore an alternative institutional design for EU referenda: referenda on EU internal issues of 
primary law10 should be held in all member states, triggered by a legal disposition, aggregated collectively 
according to a federalist procedure and binding in nature. The model we propose is similar to the Swiss model, 
where constitutional decisions are voted at the federal level through mandatory referenda. One could argue 
that the US and German models with direct democracy on the level of the states but not the federation might 
also be appropriate for the EU and would be closer to current practices. However, there are two main reasons 
to look towards the Swiss model (with direct democracy at the federal level). Firstly, while some votes are at 
member state level in the EU, they are about the Treaties and hence concern the EU level. Main decisions 
taken through referenda at the national level have therefore an impact on all member states, without all 
citizens being given the chance to participate in such decisions. Secondly, the ECI is a step in the direction of 
direct democracy at the EU level. Both elements together show that there is thus a practice in the EU and the 
EU member states to apply instruments of direct democracy to European issues and the member states can 
make the sovereign decision to hold such referenda on treaty matters. The EU practice goes in the direction of 
EU-level direct democracy. Unless that practice is abandoned all together it is advisable to make it more 
systemically coherent for all member states and to bring it more in line with standards of procedural neutrality 
and participatory power of citizens that guide direct democracy. Of course our model proposes something of a 
relatively high ideal. We do not mean to imply that while the EU remains in the gray zone between plebiscitary 
and direct democracy that all referenda in member states should be abandoned. On the contrary, such 
practices are part of a learning process and they might bring forth unforeseen results.  
As anticipated in Table 2, some important additional conditions apply to the institutional design of EU 
referenda in order to address several of the objections raised in the previous section. Against the 
implementation of direct democracy on EU issues only at certain levels of government, EU referenda could 
10 Accession or exit is thus excluded from this proposal and is in the competence of the member states. 
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 deactivate second-order voting. The referenda on European issues at the national level tend indeed to become 
a projection point for second-order voting, guided by all sorts of frustrations that stem from national or local 
politics, but might have little to do with the European issue at stake. This problem is more likely to be 
overcome by EU referenda held simultaneously in all member states, where the issue is contested in all EU 
countries at the same time and thus more likely to be assessed from the point of view of a more aggregated 
generalized interest. Simultaneity of the voting is also intended to ensure non-discrimination. Indeed, in case of 
aggregation of voting outcomes of several constituencies or peoples, the sequencing of voting dates also 
introduces distortions that do not guarantee the same formal procedure to all citizens. Constituencies who get 
to vote earlier have an advantage over those who vote later because they can set a trend and create pressure; 
constituencies who vote later have information at hand about the vote of those who voted earlier, etc. Under 
conditions of unanimity the sequencing of voting is especially problematic.  
Furthermore, research on direct democracy shows that if the issue voted on is a package of more than one 
topic, the aggregation of votes cumulates veto positions and a formal veto bias is introduced in the decision-
making procedure. Even if, as Mendez, Mendez, and Triga (2014) suggest, European treaties are not 
appropriate to single issue voting in referenda, partial amendments might be more accessible to voters. Finally, 
EU referenda’ results should be binding. This seems to be a very strong condition but its justification becomes 
quite obvious given the actual practice. If results of referenda are not taken into account the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU is undermined and citizens are further estranged from the institution. This has happened 
in the case of the vote on the Constitutional Treaty whose articles are now in the Lisbon Treaty despite being 
rejected in France and the Netherlands, as well as in Greece with the rescue package that was rejected by 
referendum only to be implemented anyway. Table 3 provides a summary of the characteristics of the ideal EU 
referenda we propose against the actual referenda held at the national level on EU issues. 
Table 3 Ideal EU referenda vs. Real national referenda on EU issues 
 EU referenda 
(Direct Democracy) 
National referenda on EU issues 
(Plebiscite) 
Trigger of individual vote 
constitutional/legal disposition or citizen 
action 
government- induced 
Political level of application (city, 
state, country, EU) 
European strategically targeted (state) 
Unity/simplicity of subject matter Yes No 
Sequencing No Yes 
Result legally binding Yes No 
 
An additional pivotal question is the aggregation rule. This question goes to the heart of the issue of the nature 
of a polity. Is it a centralistic state, a demoi-cratic federal state or a demoi-cratic international treaty system? In 
the case of the EU we can exclude variant for sure. Hence, simple majority voting as if there were a single 
European demos and no national dêmoi is not an option. The EU applies majority voting in its secondary 
legislative procedure and unanimity in primary law making. A strict unanimity condition for the aggregation of 
all popular votes of all member states would be the logically coherent application of direct democracy to 
current EU treaty making. The positive effect of this would be that treaty change would be restricted to issues 
that are broadly accepted by a majority of citizens in all member states. The negative effect could be that 
treaty change could be significantly blocked by individual veto positions of member states peoples with no 
possibility to break stalemates by intergovernmental deals. A more viable option would therefore be qualified 
double majorities. Referenda on single issues of primary law would need to be accepted by a majority of all 
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 European citizens and by a significant majority of member states peoples in a direct vote. The exact number 
cannot be determined from a purely theoretical point of view, but the current system in the council could offer 
guidance. Further points could be added: Not all Treaty reforms could be subject to mandatory referenda. The 
TEU contains the basis of European law. It determines the nature and values of the polity.  The TFEU on the 
other hand, is a secondary text that is constituted and constrained by the TEU in view of an articulation and 
implementation of the TEU’s goals. According to Lacey (MS, forthcoming), mandatory referenda should 
therefore be restricted to TEU modifications whereas an optional, citizen induced referendum should be 
introduced for changes to TFEU. Obviously, this procedural constraint could limit direct democracy to 
fundamental acts of sovereignty. With reference to Switzerland Lacey (2016) also suggests a loosening of the 
condition of single issue voting in referenda (as opposed to initiatives). As in Switzerland so in the EU the 
peoples as the sovereigns should be left with the option to pass a synthetic judgment to multi-issue reform. 
That point is sensible, but still multiple-issue votes should be the exception rather than the rule. This is the case 
in Switzerland were usually a coherent body of law is voted on. The constitution as a whole has only been put 
to the vote three times in Swiss history. Given the fact that the TEU is a stable treaty individual changes to it 
can be put to vote without a vote being made on the whole treaty. This also makes the holding of a referendum 
much more steerable towards the issues one wants to change.11 If Switzerland is in any way a real world 
example for the EU, in most cases the citizens will follow the recommendations of the government. Even a 
unanimity condition could be met in many cases if all governments agree on a treaty change. Referenda will 
make this process more inclusive and consensus oriented with an upstream effect. It is to be expected that 
transfer of competencies from the national level to the EU level will be contested with more intensity.  
What to say about referenda on secondary law? Following the normative guidance, direct democracy should 
not be limited to constitutional law but to all generally binding law making. However, a change from mandatory 
to optional referenda called by collective citizen action (signatures) is sensible. Parallel to the existing 
aggregation rules in the EU for secondary law making, the unanimity condition can be dropped altogether. 
Double majorities would still be advisable (cf. Papadopoulos 2005: 456) and hurdles in the demoicratic EU 
could be higher than in Switzerland as a federal state. Hence, optional referenda voted in or out by qualified 
double majority rules would be the two main forms of direct democracy that should be developed for Europe’s 
secondary law making process. Presumably, this gives citizens greater participation and control over law 
making but most importantly this does not only empower the people in the abstract but also the intermediary 
actors and grass-root civil society associations as well as the European Parliament and national parliaments. 
These actors will be instrumental in collecting signatures and leading or accompanying the debate.  
  
11 As Lacey comments (2016) this proposal stands in stark contrast to Pogge’s (1997) insistence that major Treaty reform 
should be subject to several rounds of single issue referenda. 
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 3. EU REFERENDA: A POSSIBILITY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
Even if the institutional design that has been proposed above is supported from a normative point of view, it is 
not possible to empirically test the potential benefit of the institutionalization of EU referenda. A number of 
aspects make this task particularly difficult. Firstly, there is so far no such thing as an EU referendum, which 
impact we could evaluate empirically making any attempt to make inferences from existing situations limited 
by the “as if” clause. Secondly, even from a comparative perspective, there are very few countries where 
referenda have been used regularly at the federal/national levels. Thirdly, in the European context, there is a 
wide variety in terms of institutional design of direct democracy making it particularly hard to think of a 
common EU referendum and its possible impact. Fourthly, so far there have been very few referenda on EU 
issues overall, and most of them have been held in the same countries. There is therefore little empirical 
evidence to fully assess how well/badly referenda on EU issues work in Europe at large. 
For all these reasons, this paper is more focused on evaluating existing practices of referenda as an attempt to 
provide some support to the theoretical prescriptions presented above. In this sense it does not seek to prove 
that EU referenda will have a general positive impact on EU democracy. Whether direct democracy at the EU 
level is normatively desirable is indeed a question that we answer positively from the point of view of 
normative theory. However, important empirical questions need to be answered as well. As Simon Hug wrote: 
“it is far from obvious whether the potentially beneficial effects of referenda at the subnational or national 
level would simply transpose to the transnational level.”(Hug 2003, 21). In the following sections we therefore 
undertake two main objectives: 1) to assess current practices of mandatory vs. optional referenda: advantages 
and disadvantages of each of these; and 2) to analyse EU citizens’ predispositions to participate both in 
national referenda on EU issues and in EU referenda – would citizens be willing to participate in EU referenda? 
And, would citizens’ participation approximate the ‘general will’? Before we go into these two objectives, we 
first provide a descriptive analysis of referenda in the EU member states. 
The idea of having a EU referendum has already been raised by several intellectuals: either as a pan-European 
referendum (Auer & Aubert 1997; Habermas 2001); a polity-wide referendum (Schmitter 2000); or a EU-wide 
referendum (Cheneval 2007; Rose 2013) (a critical revision of the proposals for the creation of a EU 
referendum is provided by Hug 2003, chapter 6). The main argument of the advocates of an EU referendum 
relates to the democratic deficit which has haunted the EU in the last years. According to Rose (2013), the 
institutionalization of a EU referendum is the only option in order to increase democratic legitimacy in the EU, 
by securing the political commitment of the citizens. Yet, intellectual discourse on the EU referenda is not 
reflected among the political elite. Quite to the contrary, referenda are viewed negatively among the political 
elites, as if they “see themselves as trustees acting for the collective good of Europe.”(Rose 2013, 4). 
Indeed, despite the numerous popular calls for the use of referenda on European matters, most European 
policymakers have been able to circumvent its use, and keep European decision-making negotiations at the 
intergovernmental level, and later on ratification by the national parliaments. The fear that European 
integration would be blocked if left to the will of the European citizens is the main justification employed 
against the use of referenda (Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2014). Recent experiences show that the EU is more 
than able to elude or simply ignore undesirable referendum outcomes. It is the case, for example, of the 
signature of the Treaty of Lisbon or the current pacts with the Greek government, which look very similar to 
the previous plan rejected last June by the Greeks in a referendum. 
The EU emulates the representative system of the member states at the European level (yet with limited 
competences in some areas, which member states are more reluctant to delegate), but has only incorporated 
the citizens’ initiative (ECI) as a direct democracy mechanism at the European level. Referenda on EU issues are 
strictly held at the national level where legislation foresees very different uses of referenda. Table 4 
summarizes some of the characteristics of different direct democracy regimes among member states 
(complete information can be found in the appendix). Table 4 illustrates that 75% of the member states 
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 regulate direct democracy in the constitution. Although almost all member states have institutionalized 
optional referenda (either in the constitution or in specific laws), mandatory referenda are far less common at 
the national level in EU member states (16 member states). 
Table 4: Legal basis of referenda in European Union member states 
 
N % 
Legal provisions for mandatory referenda 16 57.1 
Legal provisions for optional referenda 24 85.7 
Constitutional legal basis of referenda 21 75.0 
Source: Direct Democracy Dataset, International IDEA 
Where institutionalized, referenda are mandatory specially to change the national constitution, and in a 
number of countries, to transfer authority to international bodies (see Appendix, Table A.2). On the contrary, 
virtually any important issue can be submitted to optional referendum; legislation is very open and the decision 
to hold a referendum is left totally to the discretion of governmental institutions. There are also differences 
across member states with regards who can initiate an optional referendum: in some countries only the 
president and/or the legislative majority is entitled to call a referendum; whereas in others legislative 
minorities and registered electors can also initiate a referendum. Results of mandatory referenda are normally 
binding in all member states, but there are differences with regard to optional referenda. In some countries 
optional referenda are also binding (e.g. Denmark), in others they are sometimes binding (e.g. Austria), and in 
others they are never binding (e.g. Lithuania) (see Appendix, Table A.3).  
These cross-national differences provide two sorts of insights. The first is that different practices and 
legislations at the national level might prove difficult to translate in a common institution at the EU level. 
Second and rather clearly, optional referenda give more room to manoeuvre to national governments than 
mandatory referenda. Contrary to mandatory referenda, they can be called at the discretion of the 
governments (in most countries only by the majority government itself) and results are rarely binding. At first 
sight, then, there is a notable asymmetry between mandatory vs. optional referenda with regards effectiveness 
of citizens’ capacity to control and influence the decision-making process. 
This is however not reflected in the number of referenda held within each of the member states. Table 5 shows 
the number of referenda related to non-EU issues and EU issues in all EU member states, as well as national 
legislation on both types of referenda (both mandatory –column 5– and optional–column 6–, as well as EU-
issues referenda –column 4). As it appears, there is no strong correlation between how and what type of 
referenda are constitutionally regulated in a country, and the frequency with which this instrument is used in 
the same country. In the two countries where the most referenda have been held at the national level – Italy 
and Greece – only optional referenda are constitutionally regulated (see Table 6 for the mean number of 
referenda for each type of regulation). In contrast, in countries where both mandatory and optional referenda 
are regulated (e.g. Spain and Portugal), very few referenda have been celebrated at the national level. 
Activation of direct democracy instruments, therefore, seems not only to be a matter of regulation, with 
tradition and political culture also potentially playing a relevant role. The latter seems to be more difficult to 
circumvent than legal aspects, if an EU referendum were to be institutionalized. 
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 Table 5 Number of referenda on EU issues by member state and constitutional regulation 
 Number of referenda on: Constitutional provisions for: 
 EU issues* Other issues* Mandatory referenda Optional referenda 
Austria 1 3 Yes Yes 
Belgium 0 1 No No 
Bulgaria 0 5 No Yes 
Croatia 1 3 Yes Yes 
Cyprus 0 1 No No** 
CzRep 1 0 No No** 
Denmark 7 15 Yes Yes 
Estonia 1 3 Yes Yes 
Finland 1 3 No Yes 
France 3 9 Yes Yes 
Germany 0 0 Yes No 
Greece 1 36 No Yes 
Hungary 1 11 Yes Yes 
Ireland 8 29 Yes Yes 
Italy 1 70 No Yes 
Latvia 1 13 Yes Yes 
Lithuania 1 20 Yes Yes 
Luxembourg 1 7 - Yes 
Malta 1 2 Yes Yes 
Netherlands 1 0 No No 
Poland 1 12 No Yes 
Portugal 0 4 Yes Yes 
Romania 1 8 Yes Yes 
Slovakia 1 14 Yes Yes 
Slovenia 1 21 No Yes 
Spain 1 2 Yes Yes 
Sweden 2 13 No Yes 
UK 1 1 No Yes 
Total 39 306 
*Only those held at the national/federal level 
** But ad hoc referenda are possible 
Source: own elaboration, based on Méndez et al. 2014, and c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau). 
 
Table 6 Mean number of referenda by type of constitutional regulation 
 
Total EU issues 
No referenda 0.5 0.5 
Only optional 18.7 1.0 
Optional and mandatory 9.7 2.0 
Only mandatory 0 0 
Source: own elaboration, based on Méndez et al. 2014, and c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau). 
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 However, the same pattern does not appear to hold in relation to referenda on EU issues. Until August 2015, 
there have been 39 referenda related to EU issues in the member states of the European Union (see Table 5).12 
Despite having been increasingly used in relation to EU affairs (and there is indeed this optimistic view about 
the increased use of referenda on EU-related matters), the number of referenda remains very small: the mean 
number of referenda per year (from 1972, the date of the first referendum on EU issues) is less than one. As 
compared to other issues where direct democracy seems to be well entrenched within the electoral system, 
the use of referenda on EU affairs is limited. Of course quantity is not the only thing that matters, but it is 
certainly an indicator of the residual implementation of direct democracy on European affairs. 
This becomes clearer as we examine the use of referenda across countries. As already seen, referenda on non-
EU issues are far more numerous than referenda on EU issues. Even when considering that some countries 
have only recently acceded to the EU, therefore making it unlikely that they would hold referenda on EU issues 
before that, the difference is significant enough to question the limited use of referenda on EU issues. Table 5 
indicates also that, even with similar constitutional regulations, referenda on non-EU issues are very differently 
distributed across member states, with the exception of those where no constitutional regulation on referenda 
is provided (1 or less than 1 referendum has been celebrated in these four countries) (see also Table 6). Yet, on 
European issues, a clear distinction can be made between the countries which provide for constitutional 
regulation for mandatory referenda for all constitutional amendments and those that either provide for partial 
constitutional regulation or for none: in Ireland and Denmark, the number of referenda held on EU issues is 
substantially higher than in the other countries. The difference in the use of referenda related to EU issues as 
compared to non-EU related referenda is indicative of the fact that European governments avoid calling for EU 
referenda when they are not obliged to do so. On EU issues, therefore, legal constraints might have a stronger 
impact on whether a referendum is called or not (see also Table 6). 
Table 7 describes the type of referenda on EU issues from 1972 to 2015 in the EU member states. Of the 39 
referenda, 21 have been mandatory, while 18 have been called voluntarily by the incumbent party. Apparently, 
there is no relationship either between the type of referendum (optional vs. mandatory) and the type of EU 
issue that is voted in the referendum (accession vs. treaty/policy). This again indicates that there is ample room 
for discretion for governments in deciding whether to call or not to call a referendum.13  
Table 7 Number and type of referenda on EU issues 
  N % 
Optional   
Accession 7 17.9 
Treaty/policy 11 28.2 
Total 18 46.1 
Mandatory   
Accession 11 28.2 
Treaty/policy 10 25.6 
Total 21 53.9 
Total 39 100 
Source: c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau). Authors’ update with most recent referenda. 
12 In total 54 referenda in all European countries, both EU members and non-members. 
13 There are no significant differences in relation to the results of the referendum (77.7% yes votes in non-mandatory and 
80.9% yes votes in mandatory). 
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 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1: MANDATORY VS. OPTIONAL REFERENDA IN THE EU 
In this section we initially revise a set of arguments contained in previous literature to refer to the problems of 
referenda. From these, we derive a set of hypotheses that we relate to the main components of our theoretical 
model: mandatory vs. optional; and simultaneity vs. non-simultaneity; and to the European level. As already 
mentioned, there has so far been no EU referendum whereby to evaluate its possible impact (and to test our 
hypotheses).  Therefore, we try to provide some empirical evidence for our hypotheses by means of four case 
studies: 1) all referenda on EU issues; 2) the referenda of the constitutional treaty; 3) the Greece and the UK 
cases. Even if the analysis remains incomplete and does not allow for ensuring that EU referenda will be the 
optimal solution, it highlights the main problems of referenda as they are currently used. 
a) The partisan logic 
A referendum follows the logic of partisan calculus “when maximizing party and/ or presidential utility is the 
dominant motivating factor.” (Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2014, 78). Optional government induced referenda 
are likely to prompt a partisan logic. Since authorities have discretional power to call for a referendum, they 
might use it only on the issues of which they know they will receive stronger support from their partisans. 
Referenda can therefore be used as plebiscites in hands of the government, to justify specific actions. To the 
contrary, mandatory referenda would leave little room for the government to use referenda as a plebiscitary 
tool, since they could not decide on which issues they have to call a referendum.14 In relation to the EU, 
optional government induced referenda will not only tend to activate a partisan logic, but also second-order 
voting (Reif and Schmitt 1980). 
H1: The partisan logic will be activated more frequently in optional referenda than in mandatory referenda 
b) Unequal negotiating power 
Theorizing of political actors bargaining has only recently been applied to the EU sphere (Hug 2002). Even more 
recently, the bargaining power of member states has been studied in relation to the Constitutional Treaty of 
the European Union (Hug and Schulz 2007). The distinction between mandatory vs. optional referenda, 
however, is rarely taken into consideration in relation to the bargaining power of member states, probably due 
to lack of comparable data to test it.  Yet this distinction is particularly relevant in the European context, and in 
relation to the possibility to establish a EU referendum. We argue here that optional referenda are more likely 
to produce unequal negotiating power of the member states, especially if not carried out simultaneously. In 
the European Union, due to large cross-country differences in the institutions of direct democracy, member 
states can decide whether, on what and when a referendum is hold. As such, referenda might be used to 
influence the negotiation outcomes, if member states perceive there is something to win from it. In addition, 
the fact that referenda (when called) are not simultaneous in all member states might in fact reinforce the 
negotiation power of some countries against others. Related to the different negotiating power of members 
states, is the veto power inherent to optional referenda. Since referenda are held only in a few countries, these 
countries have a de facto right of veto on EU decision-making. Mandatory and simultaneous referenda would 
put all member states on an equal footing, at least from a procedural perspective. 
H2: Optional and non-simultaneous referenda on EU issues favour that some countries have a stronger 
negotiation power than others 
 
14 This does not imply that the logic of partisanship never does show up in mandatory referenda, only 
that it is less probable. 
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 c) Discrimination of the peoples 
There has been very little reflection on the discriminatory effect (on the basis of ‘one man one vote’) of actual 
referenda on EU issues (an exception is Rose 2013; Rose and Borz 2013). It is yet (and precisely) the fact that 
referenda are not institutionalized at the EU level that promotes EU citizens’ discrimination; more specifically 
that the use of referenda is left to the will of national governments. Optional referenda do indeed favour that 
citizens are discriminated against. Since the decision whether to call a referendum is left to the discretion of 
the government, citizens from some member states are given the possibility to participate in the decision, 
whereas citizens from other member states are not afforded the same possibility. As such, in its current 
practice, referenda are highly discriminatory in the European Union, as citizens of the member states that do 
not conduct referenda are disadvantaged relative to citizens of the member states that do conduct referenda. 
We would argue that mandatory EU referenda would cancel out EU citizens’ discrimination in terms of political 
rights. 
H3: Optional referenda on EU issues produce discrimination among the EU citizens 
4.1 CASE STUDY 1: REFERENDA ON EU ISSUES 
It has been shown above that in the vast majority of member states – except for those where referenda are 
mandatory on EU issues – the use of referenda on EU matters is left to the discretion of the national 
governments. We analyse the effect of this asymmetry in the use of referenda due to its optional character in 
relation to the hypotheses posed above. 
a) H1: Partisan logic 
Mendez, Mendez, and Triga (2014) provide an excellent classification on the overriding logic for holding a 
referendum on a EU issue: the logic of constitutionality, the logic of appropriateness, and the logic of partisan 
calculus. Under the logic of constitutionality a referendum is called when it is constitutionally mandatory or 
legislative.15 The logic of appropriateness is driven by legitimacy concerns: a referendum is called either 
because there are external factors that push for referendum (e.g. other member states having a referendum) 
or pressure from the inside (e.g. citizens who are strongly in favour of referendum).  The logic of partisan 
calculus follows partisan considerations on electoral benefits of the referendum. This classification is used in 
Table 8 against the two types of referenda which are of concern in this piece: mandatory vs. optional. As it can 
be seen from Table 8, optional referenda on EU issues tend to activate the partisan logic more frequently than 
mandatory referenda. Whereas only 2 of the mandatory referenda on EU issues have been called under the 
partisan logic, 12 out of 18 optional referenda have fallen under this logic (see Mendez et al 2014). As it 
appears, in so far as decision on whether to call a referendum is concerned, optional referenda are more 
frequently used as plebiscites. 
Table 8 The logic and type of referenda on EU issues 
 
Mandatory a Optional Total 
Logic of Constitutionality 11 0 11 
Logic of Appropriateness 7 6 13 
Logic of Partisan calculus 2 12 14 
a No data on the referendum on Accession to European Unified Patent Court (UPC), Denmark 2014 
Source: own elaboration, based on Méndez et al. 2014, and c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau). 
 
15 As the authors argue, however, “Only in very few cases, however, is an element of political discretion completely absent.” 
(Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2014, 75). 
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 Previous studies confirm that this is in fact the case, even if the type of referendum is generally not taken into 
consideration. To start with, there is evidence that EU citizens’ votes in referendum on EU issues are directly 
related to partisanship and evaluations of the government (Franklin, Eijk, and Marsh 1995; this is also found by 
Lubbers (2008) for the Dutch case on the Constitutional Treaty); as such, it seems probable that incumbent 
governments will make use of referenda to gain electorally. This is further confirmed by most recent findings. 
During the process of ratification of the EU constitutional treaty, for example, government parties which 
expected electoral gains supported referenda. On the contrary, incumbent parties that expected electoral 
losses opposed the referenda. This trend was highly reinforced in cases where  national elections were very 
close to the date of the referendum, and where there was high levels of support among the public for the 
constitutional treaty (Dür and Mateo 2011; similar arguments can be found in Closa 2007). Crum (2007) finds 
also that mainstream parties of countries where a referendum on the EU constitution was called endorsed the 
constitutional treaty, therefore increasing their changes to profit electorally. Similar findings are reported by 
Hug (2003) for a different period. Mendez et al. (2014) also come to the conclusion that about a third of the 
referenda related to EU issues are triggered by partisan calculus, especially when consensus between the 
incumbent and the opposition is low (see above). Although there is little evidence regarding mandatory 
referenda and the activation of the partisan logic, existing evidence seems to support Table 8. The partisan use 
of referenda seems indeed to be partially avoided when referenda are mandatory, as is the case in Ireland. In 
the two referenda on the Treaty of Nice, issue-voting predominated over second-order voting, which reflects 
the limited capacity of using referenda as a plebiscite when they are mandatory (Garry, Marsh, and Sinnott 
2005). As it appears, issue voting increases (and second order voting decreases) as the salience of the EU issue 
becomes greater and politicization of the EU issue is greater (Garry, Marsh, and Sinnott 2005). Plebiscitary 
democracy seems therefore more likely to emerge if optional referenda are used. 
b) H2: Negotiation power 
Dür and Mateo (2010) have investigated the influence of bargaining power of EU member states on their 
negotiating strategies. They find indeed that a stronger bargaining power leads to a higher capacity of the 
member states to influence the negotiation of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013, through strong criticism 
and even with the threat of a veto. There is less evidence that optional referenda are also used as a threat to 
increase the negotiation power (see Hug and Schulz 2007). We use here the classification of Dür and Mateo on 
bargaining power to observe whether there is a correlation between this and the use of referenda – either 
mandatory or optional. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the correlation between the number of mandatory (Figure 1) and optional (Figure 2) 
referenda and the negotiating power index as defined by Dür and Mateo 201016 (see Table 9 for the magnitude 
of the correlations between number of referenda and the tree components of the negotiating power index). 
16 Dür and Mateo (2010) construct “an aggregate index of bargaining power. The reason for using an index is that we only 
have 25 cases, which means that including variables for all three hypotheses and a control variable for the length of EU 
membership in a single model would be problematic. The data for net contribution that we use are from 2004 (Ministère du 
Budget, 2007, p. 37), because these were the latest data available to the Member States when they engaged in the 
negotiations. The data takes into account administrative transfers and the British rebate, as it was on this basis that the 
negotiations were carried out. Our measure of public opinion is the percentage of respondents stating that the EU was a 
bad thing in a spring 2005 Eurobarometer poll (Commission, 2005). Using these data, we create two indexes of bargaining 
power, both coming with specific strengths and drawbacks (see Table 2).7 On the one hand, we establish an index by 
ranking all 25 countries with respect to population size, net contribution and public opinion vis-à-vis the EU.We ranked 
countries that are tied with respect to the percentage of respondents stating that the EU is a bad thing by looking at the 
percentage stating that the EU is a good thing. Assuming that all variables have the same weight, we sum up the ranks 
across the three variables to arrive at the aggregate rank-based index, which gives more points to countries with larger 
bargaining power.” (Dür and Mateo 2010, 568-570). This is the index that is used in the analyses in this section. 
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 We do not expect to find any specific relationship between the number of mandatory referenda and the 
negotiating power of the member states, since the law determines the call of the referendum. Yet it is 
interesting that there is a negative correlation between number of mandatory referenda and negotiating 
power of the states, as it might well illustrate the fact that mandatory referenda are easily able to make 
countries more equal. 
Figure 1 Correlation between number of mandatory referenda in a country and negotiating power 
 
Source: own calculations, based on Dür and Mateo 2010 (see footnote 15), and c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, 
Aarau). 
Of more interest to us is the relationship between the number of optional referenda and negotiating power 
presented in Figure 2. As it can be seen, contrary to mandatory referenda, the use of optional referenda is 
positively associated with the strength of the negotiating powers of the member states: the higher the rank of 
bargaining powers of a member state, the higher the number of optional referenda held in that same member 
state. The existence of a correlation might be an indication that optional referenda on EU issues are frequently 
used as a tool to influence the negotiating process in the European Union. Interestingly so, this tool seems to 
be particularly efficient among countries that already have strong bargaining powers,17 specially if they are big 
contributors to the EU budget or if the country’s citizens are highly euroskeptic (see Table 9). As it appears, 
optional referenda might help to increase initial bargaining differences between member states, something 
which seems to be avoided by mandatory referenda. 
  
17 It is neither impossible to say whether the use of referendum in itself ought to be included as part of the indicator of the 
negotiating power of member states nor to establish the causality between use of referendum and negotiating power 
(that is, whether referenda are used by powerful states to strengthen the already strong negotiating power or whether 
only because they have strong negotiating powers states are able to use referenda. 
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 Figure 2 Correlation between number of mandatory referenda in a country and negotiating power 
 
Source: own calculations, based on Dür and Mateo 2010 (see footnote 15), and c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, 
Aarau). 
Table 9 Correlation between elements of negotiating power and number of referenda of each type 
 
Size of 
population 
Net contribution 
to EU budget1 
Euroskepticism2 Rank 
Nº mandatory ref. -0.40*** -0.28* -0.40*** -0.45*** 
Nº optional ref. 0.39** 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.66*** 
1  % Administrative transfers by country 
2 % of respondents in the country stating that membership to the EU is a bad thing 
Source: own calculations, based on Dür and Mateo 2011, and c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau). 
c) H3: Discrimination of citizens 
Citizens’ discrimination in relation to EU referenda can be evaluated from two different angles: citizens’ 
perceptions of discrimination as a consequence of not having been given the opportunity to participate in EU 
referenda; and effective participation of EU citizens in EU referenda. Unfortunately, there is no data on citizens’ 
perceptions of discrimination in relation to referenda, and we therefore rely on the effective participation of 
EU citizens in referenda to assess levels of discrimination.18 Figure 3 shows the percentage of EU citizens who 
have participated in referenda (either mandatory or optional), as compared to the percentage of EU citizens 
who have not been directly consulted on treaties. The figure shows that, in terms of political rights, a large 
18 We find no strong correlation between the number of referenda held in a country and levels of satisfaction with 
democracy or confidence in European institutions, which could be considered as a proxy for perceptions of political 
discrimination. 
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 proportion of citizens are discriminated against: on average (for the period 1982-2015) only 8% of Europeans 
have been given the right to decide on a referendum on Treaty reform. As it stands, Figure 3 indicates that the 
fact that referenda are left to the discretion of national governments is highly discriminatory in the European 
context, since most governments opt not to use this democratic instrument.19 Only where referenda are 
mandatory – as in Ireland – do governments call for referenda systematically. 
Figure 3 Percentage of EU citizens directly and not directly consulted on Treaties  
 
Source: own elaboration, based on Rose and Borz 2013 
The comparison between optional and mandatory referenda on EU issues provides evidence in line with our 
hypotheses. Optional referenda are frequently activated (and campaigned) following a partisan logic, and used 
as plebiscites in the hands of incumbent parties. They are also used more frequently in member states that 
have strong negotiating power, maybe as a way to reinforce the influence of the member states that are 
already in a better position to negotiate. Finally, optional referenda derive in high levels of discrimination of 
the citizenry at the European level, since the majority of the population is not given the right to participate in 
referenda. On the contrary – and even if this cannot be extrapolated to an ideal EU referendum – mandatory 
referenda are negatively related to partisan use and negotiating power of the member states. Hence from a 
procedural perspective, mandatory referenda seem to be related to a higher level of fairness and political 
equality than optional referenda, specially within the European context.  
4.2 CASE STUDY 2: REFERENDA ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (AND LISBON TREATY) 
Although referenda on EU issues had already been held at the beginning of the integration process (first 
referendum was in 1972), it was not until the referendum on the European constitution that a full awareness of 
the potential repercussions was aroused. Up until that moment, the majority of referenda on EU issues were 
19 It could be argued that citizens are in fact not discriminated against since decisions are taken by national parliaments who 
are representative of the citizens. Yet, de facto, voting in referenda on EU issues entitles a reduced group of citizens to 
an additional political right. Indeed, even if the vote takes place at the national level, it effectively has an impact on all 
EU citizens. 
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 related to accession to the European Union (21 of 31 of the referenda held from 1972 to 2003).20 Voting in 
referendum therefore only affected a few citizens, namely those who were to join the European Union. 
Referenda on treaty ratification or policy matters were more infrequent and were basically held in two small 
countries: Ireland and Denmark. As such, referenda on treaty ratification or EU policy matters did not have 
troubling consequences, since it only affected the countries where the referendum was held (e.g. a revised 
Treaty of Maastricht was approved only in a second referendum in Denmark, without any influence on the 
Treaty of Maastricht; or the no-vote in the referendum on the Euro in Sweden did not impede that the 
Eurozone continued to work as it had done since 1999). With the Constitution of the European Union, it could 
be seen for the first time how the results of the referenda have had an impact on the whole constituency of the 
European Union.21 At this moment there was indeed a change, as the mechanism – the referenda – that ought 
to legitimize what was intended to be a constitution for Europe completely failed to fulfil its purpose. 
Unsurprisingly, calls for an EU-wide referendum gained considerable prominence during the convention 
process that produced the Draft Constitutional Treaty. Initially some thirty-five of the convention’s members 
put forth a proposal for an EU-wide referendum to be held on the Constitutional Treaty on the same day across 
all the member states, and for it to be binding where constitutionally possible; by the end of the convention 
process some ninety-seven convention members had signed a petition for a Europe-wide referendum which 
was also supported by the Liberals and the Greens in the European Parliament. The Praesidium, however, 
chose not to pursue this option. (Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2014, 195).  
Rather than replacing the treaty ratification procedures, the promoters of the European constitution thought of 
institutionalizing a completely new mechanism of ratification, which would give stronger legitimacy to the 
constitutional treaty. Yet, the idea was forgotten, and the decision to hold a referendum was left to the 
discretion of each member state. From June 2003 to July 2004, ten countries announced they would have a 
referendum (in that order: Spain, Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, Czech Republic, Poland, 
United Kingdom, Belgium – then withdrawn – and France). Except for Ireland – where a referendum was even 
not announced since it was required – it is interesting that it was the decision in all these countries to hold an 
optional referendum. The first referendum was held in Spain, where the yes-vote was only marginally 
victorious. The following referenda were held in France and the Netherlands, where the Constitutional Treaty 
was rejected. Despite the triumph of the yes-vote won in Luxembourg after France and the Netherland, the 
process was stopped, to begin a period of reflection after the defeat of the Treaty in France and the 
Netherlands. In a way, the use of referenda (even if optional) had a positive impact, since it promoted 
reflection and deliberation on an issue that was of major relevance for the integration process and the 
European citizens. On the negative side, due to the fact that referenda were not mandatory and were not hold 
in all member states simultaneously, the referendum had a de-legitimizing effect on the constitutional treaty in 
particular, and the EU as a whole. Since referenda were optional, member states could withdraw their 
announcement of referendum at the time the Lisbon Treaty was ready for ratification. As a consequence and 
even if ratified by national parliaments, the Lisbon treaty might suffer from a lack of legitimacy.22 In relation to 
the referenda as an instrument of direct democracy, the feeling prevailed that referenda only promoted 
disruption and deadlock of the integration process, and the idea of a EU referendum was dismissed by the 
political elites.  
20 On how referenda on accession were used to increase legitimacy see Jahn and Storsved 1995. 
21 This also coincides with the end of the era of permissive consensus and the beginning of stronger politicization and 
euroskepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
22 For example, Stuart Wheeler (one of the major donors of the Conservative Party at the time and later on strong 
supporter of UKIP) brought a case Court against the UK government claiming that the government was legally bound by an 
election promise to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The government said that the promise was no longer valid as it 
was for the constitutional treaty for which the referendum was promised. 
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 Interestingly, negative views on the constitutional referenda have rarely considered that their malfunction 
might have been caused by birth defects, namely the fact that the referendum has not been mandatory in all 
EU member states, and that they have been held sequentially. An in-depth study of the constitutional 
referenda by Hug and Schulz (2007) shows that calling for a referendum has in fact lead to an advantage to 
negotiations during the EU constitutional process, especially if governments had scheduled a referendum 
before the IGC and voters had a strong preference for the status quo. In addition, partisan logic was activated 
in three out of the four constitutional referenda (Luxembourg, Spain and the Netherlands) (see Mendez et al 
2014), although first order voting seemed to prevail (Glencross and Trechsel 2011). 
This experience had important implications at the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Firstly, there 
was no other attempt to introduce direct democracy instruments to legitimatize the new Treaty. Secondly, the 
Irish referendum (the only country where a referendum was mandatory) was used in some countries to 
influence the ratification process. Purporting past experiences with referenda on EU Treaties, the no-vote in 
the first Irish referendum was used as a tool by some countries to delay approval of the Lisbon treaty in the 
parliament (and it was in fact the main reason why the treaty was not approved in January 2009 as initially 
planned). In the Czech Republic, it was decided that they would not sign until Ireland has ratified the treaty; in 
Poland, after the no-vote in the Irish referendum the prime minister said that it would be pointless to sign the 
treaty before a solution to the Irish referendum was found. Either way, therefore, referenda were prey to 
tendentious use by member states governments and parties alike. 
4.3 CASE STUDIES 3 & 4: GREECE AND UK – NEGOTIATING PARTICULAR ISSUES 
Greece 2015: The referendum that took place in Greece on 5 July 2015 to vote on the bailout conditions 
proposed by the EU provides another example of the use of optional referenda as plebiscite. Yet in this case, 
both the member state and the EU were two clearly differentiated political actors. On the one hand, the 
government lead by Tsipras called for a referendum as a last attempt to increase its negotiating powers in front 
of the European Union.23 On the other hand, the European Union campaigned actively against the ‘No’ in the 
referendum with increasing pressure on the Greek government. For the first time, the European Union adopted 
a strong position in a national referendum, and played an active role in the referendum process.24 Worse from 
the point of view of direct democracy is that the results of the referendum have not been binding and 
practically the same if not a more severe agreement was signed between Greece and the EU after the majority 
of the Greek population had voted against it.  
UK: The UK uses the optional exit referendum as a tool to achieve stronger negotiating powers in the EU. Both 
pro- and anti-EU parties are in favour of this referendum in the UK as it considerably increases the negotiating 
power of UK. The reason for this is the option of renegotiation with the EU. The referendum is used as a 
pressure tool to transform the EU to the liking of the UK, one could say (Glencross 2015, 308). This point is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that the UK has consulted widely with other member states and presents 
points that are backed by a coalition of member states. Referenda can also be understood as a manifestation of 
the rise of populism in UK and the EU, rather than as a democratic practice (Wellings and Vines 2015) 
 
 
 
 
23 See, for example: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33492387 
24 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5314_es.htm 
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 5 CITIZENS’ PREFERENCES FOR EU REFERENDA 
Another relevant aspect in relation to the referenda question is whether European citizens do in fact support 
the existence of a EU referendum. Several studies have addressed EU citizens’ attitudes and behavior in 
referenda on EU issues. Previous evidence shows that EU referenda increase public support for European 
integration, especially immediately after they have voted in an EU-related referendum (Christin and Hug 2002). 
The use of referenda seems therefore to positively affect citizens’ perceptions of the European Union project. 
Hobolt (2006) also finds that exposure to information makes Europeans more aware of the importance of the 
EU and promotes issue voting (rather than second order voting) in EU-related referenda. Less has been 
investigated, however, on EU citizens’ preferences to direct democracy in general, and to the 
institutionalization of direct democracy in the European Union in particular. Would citizens be willing to 
participate in EU referenda if they were given the opportunity to do so?  
Data on turnout of European parliament elections and referenda on EU issues provide some evidence in this 
regard. Table 10 shows the difference in turnout in referenda on EU issues minus average turnout in EP 
elections. As can be seen from the table, turnout in referenda on EU issues is higher than in EU parliament 
elections. Only in two countries and in three referenda has turnout been lower in referenda than in EP 
elections (Ireland 2001, Ratification of the Treaty of Nice; Ireland 1987, Ratification of the Single European Act; 
Spain 2005, Ratification of the EU constitution). In all the other referenda held on EU issues turnout has been 
much higher than in EP elections. On average (between all referenda in all countries) turnout has been 22% 
higher in referenda than in EP elections. This data might therefore be an indication that EU citizens are likely to 
participate in EU referenda and that this higher participation indeed would enhance the legitimacy of the EU. 
Also important, and considering that one of the main critiques of the EP elections is the low turnout rate, it 
seems that referenda perform better in terms of activating citizens’ participation than representative 
institutions. 
Table 10 Turnout in referenda as compared to EP elections* 
 
> EP 
> Referendum 
(0-10%) 
> Referendum 
(11-20%) 
> Referendum 
(21-30%) 
> Referendum 
(31-40%) 
> Referendum 
(>40%) 
non-mandatory 1 1 4 4 6 2 
mandatory 2 6 2 4 5 2 
Total 3 7 6 8 11 4 
*Average turnout in referenda on EU issues minus average turnout in EP elections for each of the countries. 
>EP: turnout in EP elections is higher than turnout in referenda 
>Referendum (0-10%): turnout in referenda is up to 10% higher than turnout in EP election 
> Referendum (11-20%): turnout in referenda is up to 20% higher than turnout in EP election 
> Referendum (21-30%): turnout in referenda is up to 30% higher than turnout in EP election 
> Referendum (31-40%): turnout in referenda is up to 40% higher than turnout in EP election 
> Referendum (>40%): turnout in referenda is more than 40% higher than turnout in EP election 
Source: own elaboration, based on c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau) and European Election Database – 
NSD. 
 
Citizens’ preferences for direct democracy are better described by means of survey data. Two surveys at 
different points in time include a question related to referenda. The European Election Study (EES) was 
conducted before the elections to the European parliament in 2009. In between a list of questions related to 
different issues (such as welfare policies, immigration, etc.), a question was posed that asked whether the 
respondents agree that EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum. The question leaves open to 
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 interpretation how and at which level25 the referendum should be held, and is very specific about the type of 
issue which should be voted in referenda: EU treaty changes. An Eurobarometer survey conducted in February 
– March 2006 (relatively shortly after the last constitutional referendum had been held in Luxembourg in July 
200526) asks EU citizens how likely they would be to participate in voting in referenda organized on the same 
day in all European Member States on European issues. Contrary to the EES, this item specifies the level of the 
referendum – the EU – while also broadening the range of issues that might be voted in referenda. At face 
value, this item approximates the normative ideal proposed in this paper to a higher degree: an EU referendum 
held simultaneously in all member states. Although the two items cannot be directly compared, since they ask 
about different types of attitudes (one is about a preference – whether they think or not that EU treaties 
should be voted in referenda – and another about a behavior – how likely it is that they would vote in a 
referendum if there was one, independent of whether they are in favour of its existence or not), it is precisely 
this difference which makes them interesting for analysis, as they provide complementary pieces of 
information. 
The two questions are graphically represented in Figure 4. Light grey in the figure presents mean levels of 
agreement with having a referendum on EU treaties in each member state (EES question; the graph is ordered 
according to this question); while dark grey represents how likely citizens of each member state – mean for 
each country – would participate in an EU referendum (Eurobarometer question). Figure 4 is indicative of a 
number of things. Firstly, most Europeans tend to agree that EU treaties should be voted in referenda: the 
mean for all countries is above 3 (the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ option). Some countries are specially in 
favour of having a referendum on EU treaties, namely Ireland, Bulgaria, the UK and Greece; which might not 
come as a surprise in the case of Ireland, where it is mandatory that EU treaties are voted in referenda. As it 
appears, EU citizens have a medium to strong preference for the use of referenda in EU treaties. Secondly, 
there is a relatively high variance in EU citizens’ willingness to participate in EU referenda if they were given the 
opportunity. The likelihood to vote in EU referenda is very high in Denmark for example (mean is 9.0), but is 
rather low in Portugal (mean is less than 6). Standard deviation is 3.1 points, which indicates a large variation 
across Europe. Third, at the aggregate level, there seems to be a sort of decoupling between citizens’ 
preferences for referenda on EU treaties and citizens’ behavior if given the chance to participate in referenda. 
Cross-country correlation between the two indicators is weak and even negative (-0.23). On average, this data 
suggests that it is not in the countries where citizens are more in favour of voting on EU treaties in referenda 
that turnout in EU referenda will be the highest. Quite the contrary, being strongly in favour of having national 
referenda on EU treaties seems to reduce the chances that citizens of a country will be willing to vote in an EU 
referenda. This might be interpreted as a consequence of the different nature of the questions, and what each 
of them is capturing. We therefore analyse in more detail the correlation of these two questions. 
  
25 In all likelihood they consider the national level, since most of the other issues of this battery of items relate to the 
national level. 
26 This is of relative importance, considering the defeat of national referenda on the constitutional treaty. 
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 Figure 4 Preferences for referenda on EU treaties and likelihood to vote in EU referenda 
 
EU referendum: Using a scale from 1 to 10, how likely would you participate in the following: Voting in referenda organized 
on the same day in all European Member States on European issues (10-point scale) 
Referendum on EU treaties: Now I will read out some statements to you. For each of the following statements, please tell 
me to what degree you agree or disagree with each statement. Do you ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 
‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’? EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum (5-point scale) 
Source: Eurobarometer 65.1, 2006 and EES 2009 
 
To this aim, we have estimated a multilevel model, taking each of the questions as a dependent variable. Since 
the main objective of this exercise is to define the profiles of the citizens, especially concerning whether they 
are more/less in favour of referenda, our independent variables are aimed at capturing respondents’ attitudes 
to the European Union. This is not only relevant with regards acknowledging which types of citizens are more 
willing to support the use of referenda; but also to address one of the main suspicions of European politicians 
against referenda: that the EU integration process would be blocked if citizens are allowed to vote in referenda. 
We have estimated two separate models for each of the dependent variables. In the first model, we only 
incorporate individual level variables; in the second model, we incorporate in addition, a macro level variable, 
which accounts for the number of referenda on EU issues held in each of the countries. The models differ 
slightly for the two dependent variables, due to differences in the number of questions in each of the 
questionnaires. Yet all the indicators refer to citizens’ attitudes and evaluations of the European Union. In 
addition to these, we control for age, gender, level of education, and ideology. Results are presented in Tables 
11 and 12. 
Results confirm that the profile of the respondents supporting referenda on EU treaties and those who are 
more likely to vote in EU referenda differ. Table 11 shows that respondents who are more supportive of 
referenda on EU treaties tend to be more negatively oriented to the European Union and to evaluate it worse 
than respondents who are less supportive of this type of referenda. All four independent variables included in 
the model (whether EU membership is a good thing; whether the EU parliament takes into account the 
concerns of European citizens; whether the EU institutions are trustworthy; and whether the EU has a positive 
influence on the country’s economy) are negatively and significantly correlated to our dependent variable. As it 
appears, stronger support for referenda on EU treaties reflects mistrust for the European Union and stronger 
preferences to keep decisions and autonomy at the national level. Interestingly, model 2 shows that citizens’ 
support for referenda on EU treaties is independent on the number of referenda on EU issues held in the 
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 country (although the relationship is positive, it is not significant). Preferences for referenda on EU treaties do 
not derive from previous experience, but rather encapsulate citizens’ attitudes to the European Union. 
Table 11 Support for referenda on EU Treaties (EES 2009) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
      
Age 0.000689 0.000733 
 
(0.000726) (0.000727) 
Gender (male=1) -0.0292 -0.0294 
 
(0.0198) (0.0198) 
Level of education  -0.0334*** -0.0335*** 
(from low to high education) (0.00358) (0.00358) 
Ideology -0.00434 -0.00433 
(0=left; 10=right) (0.00312) (0.00312) 
Membership to the EU is a good thing -0.224*** -0.224*** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0145) 
EU parliament takes into account concerns of EU citizens -0.0291*** -0.0291*** 
 
(0.00910) (0.00910) 
Confidence in political institutions -0.0777*** -0.0775*** 
 
(0.00941) (0.00941) 
The EU has a positive influence in country’s economy -0.0633*** -0.0634*** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0109) 
Number of EU referenda in country 
 
0.0441 
  
(0.0319) 
Constant 4.435*** 4.371*** 
 
(0.0781) (0.0893) 
   Observations 17,444 17,444 
Number of groups 26 26 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: own calculations, EES 2009. 
On the contrary, citizens who affirm to be more willing to vote in EU referenda are those who are more 
positively oriented to the EU: they tend to believe that membership of the EU is a good thing, and tend also to 
be in favour of transferring larger competences to the European Union. In this case, experience in referenda on 
EU issues at the national level has a positive impact on the likelihood to be willing to vote in a EU referendum.27  
 
 
 
  
27  Results are consistent with https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-meldungen/2015/oktober/eu-
citizens-still-trust-in-the-european-union-and-the-euro/ 
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 Table 12 Support for EU referenda (Eurobarometer 65.1, 2006) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
      
Age 0.00429*** 0.00434*** 
 
(0.00141) (0.00141) 
Gender (male=1) 0.212*** 0.212*** 
 
(0.0434) (0.0434) 
Level of education  0.150*** 0.150*** 
(from low to high education) (0.00917) (0.00916) 
Ideology 0.00318 0.00305 
(0=left; 10=right) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Membership to the EU is a good thing 0.627*** 0.625*** 
 
(0.0325) (0.0325) 
The EU should broaden its scope of government 0.0361*** 0.0362*** 
 
(0.00345) (0.00344) 
Number of EU referenda in country 
 
0.203*** 
  
(0.0520) 
Constant 5.525*** 5.223*** 
 
(0.171) (0.170) 
   Observations 16,703 16,703 
Number of groups 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Source: own calculations, Eurobarometer 65.1, 2006 
These results contradict the general idea that allowing European citizens to decide on European issues in a 
referendum will block the integration process (respondents in favour of enlarging the scope of the European 
Union are also more willing to participate in EU referenda). The type of referendum seems yet to be 
determinant, and in line with the hypotheses anticipated in this paper: while national referenda (most of the 
times non-mandatory) would tend to bias European policy making towards the preferences of the citizens who 
are more negative about the European Union (even if the results are only binding at the national level), it looks 
as if EU referenda would be more effective at reconciling EU citizens’ preferences. 
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 6. DIRECT DEMOCRACY: LEARNING FROM THE SWISS CASE? 
In this section we summarize aspects of direct democracy in Switzerland that we find relevant for the EU. The 
lessons we draw from this section are formulated in the conclusions of this report. Direct democracy is today 
well-entrenched in the Swiss political system, and strongly supported by the public (more than 90% of the 
Swiss consider that their country is an example of democracy, according to Point de Suisse 2015). In fact, direct 
democracy has evolved in parallel to state formation, and has become a fundamental aspect of Swiss identity 
(see Deliverable 4.2). Even if there are contradictory stories on the development of direct democracy in 
Switzerland (either as a direct successor of local direct democracy or as influenced by the French occupation 
(Kobach 1994), there is no doubt that it has become part of the definition of the Swiss system. 
The evolution of direct democracy in Switzerland has been gradual, although no major change in the different 
instruments of direct democracy has taken place since the beginning of the 20th century (see Table 13).  
The most important direct democratic institutions that are actually in operation on all state 
levels are the mandatory referendum to sanction constitutional change, the optional 
referendum to challenge already passed legislation, and the citizens’ initiative to revise the 
Constitution (or laws in the cantons) from outside parliament.(Serdült 2014, X)  
In 2003, there was a positive vote on a popular ‘general initiative’, but this additional instrument never entered 
into force since it was later rejected by popular vote in 2009 (Art. 139 Swiss constitution; Biaggini 2011).  All 
federal forms of direct democracy are binding, not consultative. 
The main instruments of direct democracy at the federal level in Switzerland are the mandatory referendum, 
the optional referendum and the initiative. The description that follows is based on Linder 2007. The 
mandatory referendum must be called by the government in relation to any constitutional amendment or 
ratification of treaties on membership in supranational organizations. In addition, governments are obligated 
to call a referendum in cases were urgent federal legislation has been introduced without the required 
constitutional basis, whose validity exceeds one year. In order to be passed a mandatory referendum requires a 
double majority of the population and the cantons (see Table 13). 
The optional referendum is held in relation to laws, federal ordinances, or permanent international treaties on 
membership in an international organization. Optional referenda are called if 50000 citizens or eight cantons 
request it, and they enter into force if approved by simple majority. 
Finally, citizens’ initiatives are used to propose partial amendment or total revision of the constitution. “If a 
popular initiative meets the current 18-months deadline, it is debated by the Federal Council and the 
Parliament and then presented to the voters with a recommendation, which is usually negative. The Parliament 
may simultaneously submit a counterproposal.” (Linder 2007, 106).28  
As can be seen in Figure 5, the use of direct democracy has grown considerably over time. This applies to all 
types of referenda, even if the use of the initiative seems to have been extended in recent times. Yet on 
average, all types of direct democracy instruments have increased in use across time, although literature points 
to the fact that periods when there are more referenda usually correspond to an increase in party competition 
(Leemann 2015). 
  
28 At the cantonal level, the use of direct democracy varies greatly between the cantons, both in the form and the effective 
participation. We do not elaborate on cantonal direct democracy here, since our main focus is on the federal level. 
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 Table 13 Swiss Federal Institutions of Direct Democracy 
Institution 
Date of 
introduction 
Promoter 
Nature object 
of vote 
Majority 
required 
Mandatory constitutional referendum 1848 - 
constitutional 
amendment 
double 
Mandatory constitutional referendum on the 
principle of a total revision of the Constitution 
1848 - 
question of 
principle 
simple  
Popular initiative for a total revision of the 
Constitution 
1848 
100000 
electors 
question of 
principle 
simple 
Optional legislative referendum 1874 
50000 
electors or 
eight cantons 
federal law simple 
Popular initiative for a partial revision of the 
Constitution (precisely formulated) 
1891 
100000 
electors 
Constitution double 
Popular initiative for a partial revision of the 
Constitution (formulated in general terms) 
1891  
(modified 2009) 
100000 
electors 
question of 
principle 
simple 
Counterproposal to a popular initiative for a partial 
revision of the Constitution (precisely formulated) 
1891 - 
constitutional 
amendment 
double 
Optional referendum for international treaties 
1921 (extended 
in 1977) 
50000 
electors or 
eight cantons 
international 
treaty 
simple 
Mandatory referendum for unconstitutional, 
‘urgent’ laws applicable for more than one year 
1949 - urgent law double 
Optional referendum for constitutional, ‘urgent’ 
laws applicable for more than one year 
1949 
50000 
electors or 
eight cantons 
urgent laws simple 
Mandatory referendum for certain international 
treaties 
1977 - 
international 
treaty 
double 
Source: Updated from Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, page 51. 
 
One of the main criticisms direct democracy is subjected to in Switzerland is low level of turnout. Figure 6 
shows that turnout crossed the threshold of 50% in the 1950s and has never again surpassed this border. This 
period seems to coincide with the highest increase in number of referenda shown in Figure 5 above, which 
might be an indication of a sort of ‘overload’ of direct democracy in Switzerland. Excessive offers of direct 
democracy would result in lower interest from Swiss citizens to participate although this critique has been 
challenged by recent evidence. As it appears, turnout is not dramatically low in Switzerland if one considers the 
aggregated turnout of all referenda held in a year. Indeed, although citizens do not vote systematically in all 
referenda, they participate on average in some of them per year. This is called selective participation, in which 
citizens select to participate in the referendums related to the issues they are more interested in (Sciarini et al. 
2016). According to these authors, this is not bad news for direct democracy, rather the contrary. Since citizens 
vote only in the issues they are more interested in, their votes are better informed than if they would have 
voted in all issues. 
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 Figure 5 Number of referenda of each type by period 
 
Source: c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau) 
 
Figure 6 Levels of turnout by type of referendum across time 
 
Source: c2d database (Centre for Direct Democracy, Aarau) 
Another criticism of direct democracy in Switzerland (and against direct democracy in the EU) is that its use 
limits the control of the decision-making process by the political elite; and brings to a deadlock the decision-
making process (and of integration at the EU level). Evidence from the Swiss case shows that the extensive use 
of direct democratic instruments does not impede the normal functioning of democratic representative 
institutions (Trechsel and Sciarini 1998). Indeed,  
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 “most legislation is passed by parliament without interference from the voters. Roughly 93 per cent of 
all bills formally subjected to the optional referendum are actually not challenged (Kriesi and Trechsel 
2008: 57). In fact, most of the bills going through parliament are even prepared by the administration 
under the auspices of the executive. But all issues that are put to a ballot vote are debated in 
parliament beforehand. Hence, the literature often refers to the Swiss political system as being a semi-
direct democracy.” (Serdült 2014; see also Figure 7).  
This does not mean that direct democracy institutions have had no impact on representative institutions in 
Switzerland. However, rather than blocking decision-making or limiting the control of political elites, the Swiss 
system has arrived – partly thanks to direct democracy – on a negotiation democracy (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 
58). 
Figure 7 Percentage of parliamentary bills voted in a referendum 
 
Source: Serdült 2007, page 1 
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 7. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Evidence provided in this paper has shown that optional referenda are unhealthy when used in a plebiscitary 
manner by national governments.  
2. Based on existing literature, we have proposed that referenda should be held simultaneously at the 
European level. While one might be inclined to think that countries that do hold referendums on EU Treaty 
change contribute to the legitimacy of the EU decisions, important inequalities are introduced by this practice 
that potentially cancel the positive effect altogether or even turn it into a negative effect. Citizens who get to 
vote in a Treaty referendum have greater control over the European constitutional project than those who do 
not. Moreover, the lack of simultaneity between countries that actually do hold referenda produces 
distortions. Positive results in earlier referenda asymmetrically impact public debate on referendums held 
elsewhere later on, whereas negative results by earlier referenda effectively cancel the results of later 
referenda still to be held in other countries. The meaning and opportunity for public debate that the 
referendum is supposed to engender is thereby undermined.  
3. As it appears from the evidence produced in this report, many European citizens are likely to participate 
more in European votes if they would be given the opportunity of referenda.  
4. While comparing the Swiss case with the EU has proven to be very beneficial in some areas, it becomes 
difficult with regard to direct democracy. There is no such thing as direct democracy as we have defined it at 
the European level and in the member states. Yet, understanding the Swiss case might help to better frame a 
model for referenda for the European Union.  
Lesson 1 for the EU: direct democracy has evolved gradually in Switzerland and its use has also been gradually 
extended through interplay between the cantonal and federal levels. EU referenda should not be introduced 
without introducing direct democracy on the country levels. Country level referenda should not be introduced 
in a manner that is totally decoupled from the EU level.  
Lessons 2 for the EU: even if the extensive use of referenda seems good a priori, it might lead to low turnout 
(and therefore in the case of the EU – low legitimacy). Unless well-entrenched in the political system, it seems 
more beneficial to have referenda only on the most important issues. From this perspective, it might be more 
advisable for the EU to only have mandatory referenda on single issues of treaty reforms (evidence on EU 
initiatives does however not indicate that the number of initiatives has increased dramatically since its 
institutionalization, but it might be too early to say). 
Lessons 3 for the EU: direct democracy exerts the role of control and legitimization on the decision-making of 
representative institutions in Switzerland. In addition, direct democracy in Switzerland has promoted 
consensus among the different political actors. 
Lesson 4 for the EU: In relation to the difference between mandatory and optional referenda, there is a claim 
that the Swiss government has used referenda as a way to impose (and legitimise) policy preferences 
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 (Papadopoulos 2005; see also Lane 2013). Evidence, however, points to the fact that, even in Switzerland, 
optional referenda might be activated more often under a partisan logic than mandatory referenda (Kriesi 2006). According to Serdült and Welp (2012) optional referenda are used by some parties to concentrate 
power and serve as a partisan strategy. Even in a context where direct democracy is extended, optional 
referenda seem to be used for partisan purposes.  
Lesson 5 for the EU: The EU need not limit direct democratic opportunity structure to primary law. In fact 
secondary law might be even more adequate for this practice as it does not necessitate a unanimity criterion. 
Referenda on secondary law would not need to be subject to a unanimity requirement. The QMV formula 
could be adapted here (cf. Papadopoulos 2005: 456), presenting a slightly higher hurdle to the success of a 
referendum than is present with Switzerland’s double majority requirement.  
Lesson 6 for the EU: European politics is consensual and can be expected to remain so if it became a semi-direct 
democracy. Introducing the optional referendum in secondary law making is therefore unlikely to have a 
transformative effect in this sense. In Switzerland it helped to constitute consensual forms of democratic 
politics. But the optional referendum can be expected to empower a variety of actors in different ways as 
intermediaries in the direct democratic process. In particular, national parliaments, the European Parliament 
and grassroots CSOs may be empowered by these new mechanisms of direct democracy. These kinds of actors 
are important for collecting signatures and significantly contribute to the campaigns preluding popular votes in 
Switzerland. 
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 APPENDIX 
Table A.1 Characteristics of referenda in member states 
Country 
Mandatory 
referenda 
Optional 
referenda 
Legal basis First referendum 
Any referendum 
since 1980? 
Austria Yes Yes C; SL 1,938 Yes 
Belgium No No  1,950 No 
Bulgaria No Yes C; SL 1,922  
Croatia Yes Yes C; SL 1,991 Yes 
Cyprus No 
No, but ad hoc 
referenda are 
possible 
 1,950 Yes 
Czech Republic No 
No, but ad hoc 
referenda are 
possible 
 2,003 Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes C; SL 1,916 Yes 
Estonia Yes Yes C; SL 1,923 Yes 
Finland No Yes C; SL; R 1,931 Yes 
France Yes Yes C; SL 1,793 Yes 
Germany Yes No C 1,926  
Greece No Yes C; SL 1,920  
Hungary Yes Yes  1,989 Yes 
Ireland Yes Yes C; SL 1,937 Yes 
Italy No Yes C; SL 1,929 Yes 
Latvia Yes Yes C; SL 1,923 Yes 
Lithuania Yes Yes C; SL 1,991 Yes 
Luxembourg  Yes  1,919 Yes 
Malta Yes Yes  1,870 Yes 
Netherlands No No R 2,005 Yes 
Poland No Yes C; SL; R 1,946 Yes 
Portugal Yes Yes C; SL 1,933 Yes 
Romania Yes Yes C; SL; R 1,864 Yes 
Slovakia Yes Yes C; SL; R 1,994 Yes 
Slovenia No Yes C; SL 1,990 Yes 
Spain Yes Yes C; SL 1,947 Yes 
Sweden No Yes C; SL 1,910 Yes 
United Kingdom No Yes SL 1,975  
C= Constitutional basis 
SL= Specific laws/ legislation 
R= Regulations 
Source: Direct Democracy Dataset, IDEA 
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 Table A.2 Characteristics of referenda in member states (continued) 
Country 
Issues in relation to which referenda are mandatory 
at the national level 
Issues in relation to which referenda are optional at 
the national level 
Austria 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Transfer of authority to international bodies 
# National sovereignty, national self-determination 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Adoption of international treaties 
# National sovereignty, national self-determination 
# Conflict between constitutional organs 
# Devolution 
# Civil service 
# Taxes and public expenditure commitments 
Belgium     
Bulgaria None 
Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
Croatia Adoption of international treaties Any issue of national importance 
Cyprus     
Czech Republic     
Denmark 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Transfer of authority to international bodies 
# Altering the voting age 
# Adoption of international treaties 
# Bills 
Estonia Constitutional amendments 
Any issue except those excluded and obligatory (see 
sources) 
Finland None Not specified by legislation 
France 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Treaties pertaining to the accession of a state to the 
EU and to the European Communities 
# Adoption of international treaties 
# Civil service 
# Economic or Social Reforms 
Germany Total revision of Constitution None 
Greece None 
# Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
# Existing laws on important social issues 
Hungary     
Ireland Constitutional amendments Any issue of national importance 
Italy     
Latvia 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Adoption of international treaties 
# Transfer of authority to international bodies 
# Dissolution of the Parliament 
Adoption of a law 
Lithuania 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Transfer of authority to international bodies 
# National sovereignty, national self-determination 
# See comments 
Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
Luxembourg     
Malta     
Netherlands None None 
Poland None 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Adoption of international treaties 
# Transfer of authority to international bodies 
Portugal Devolution 
Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
Romania 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Removal of President 
Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
Slovakia 
Entering into or withdrawing from a union with other 
states; Dismissal of President 
Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
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Slovenia None 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Transfer of authority to international bodies 
# Any issue of national importance, except those 
excluded 
Spain Constitutional amendments Any issue of national importance 
Sweden None 
# Constitutional amendments 
# Any issue of national importance 
United Kingdom None Any issue decided by legislation 
Source: Direct Democracy Dataset, IDEA 
 
Table A.3 Characteristics of referenda in member states 
Country Initiative for optional refer.? Requirements to pass Results binding? 
Austria 
# Legislative majority 
# Legislative minority 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - sometimes 
Belgium       
Bulgaria 
# Legislative majority 
# Registered electors 
Optional - simple majority Optional – always 
Croatia 
# President 
# Legislative majority 
# Registered electors 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - always 
Cyprus       
Czech Republic       
Denmark 
# Legislative majority 
# Legislative minority 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - always 
# Consultative - may not be 
binding. 
Estonia 
# President 
# Legislative majority 
# Legislative minority 
# Also factions, committees of 
parliament. 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - always 
Finland Legislative majority Not specified by legislation Never 
France 
# Government 
# President 
# Legislative majority 
No data Always 
Germany Not applicable No data No data 
Greece 
# Government 
# Legislative majority 
Optional - simple majority Always 
Hungary     Sometimes 
Ireland President 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - always 
Italy     Always 
Latvia 
# Registered electors 
# See also comments 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - always 
Lithuania 
# Legislative minority 
# Registered electors 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Mandatory - qualified majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - never 
Luxembourg     Sometimes 
Malta     Sometimes 
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 Netherlands     Not applicable 
Poland 
# President 
# Legislative majority 
# Optional - simple majority Optional – always 
Portugal 
# Government 
# President 
# Legislative majority 
# Registered electors 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - always 
Romania President 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - never 
Slovakia 
# Government 
# Legislative majority 
# Registered electors 
# See comments 
# Mandatory - simple majority 
# Optional - simple majority  
Slovenia 
# Legislative majority 
# Legislative minority 
# Registered electors 
# Optional - simple majority 
# Consultative - not applicable 
Binding, except consultative 
Spain 
# Government 
# Legislative majority 
Not specified by legislation 
# Mandatory - always 
# Optional - never 
Sweden Legislative majority No special requirements Optional - never 
United Kingdom Legislative majority Not specified by legislation 
# Sometimes 
# Not specified by legislation 
Source: Direct Democracy Dataset, IDEA 
 
47 
  
